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JURISPRUDENCE AS NARRATIVE: AN
AESTHETIC ANALYSIS OF MODERN
LEGAL THEORY
ROBIN WEST*

Recent legal scholarship has engaged in a growing dialogue tying literary cn"licism to
jurisprudence. In this article, Pro/essor Robin West adds her voice by advocating the
reading oj legal theory as a form of narratil'e. Drawing from Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Crilicism. Professor West first derails four literary my/Its thot combine contrasting )f,wld visions and norrotilYi methods. She then applies Frye's categories to
Anglo-American jurisprudential traditions and employs aesthetic principles to analyze
influential/egol theorists within these traditions. Finally. Professor West argues thot

recognizing rhe aesthetic dimension of legal debate/rees u.s to realize our moral ideals.
I NTRODUCTION

It is now a commonplace that lawyers and legal theorists have much
to learn from literature.' We surely can learn something about the law
from great works of literature that deal with legal themes, such as
Kafka's The Trial and Melville's Billy Budd. 2 But apart from the law
depicted in literature, legal theory itself contains a substantial narrative
component that can be analyzed as literature. Modem legal theorists
• Assistant Professor of Law, Cleve1and-Marshall College of Law. Visiting Professor of
Law, Stanford Law School. B.A.• 1976. J.D., 1979, University of Maryland; J.S.M., 1982,
Stanford University.
I would like to thank Professors Joel Finer and James Wilson of Cleve1and·Marshall College of Law, Tom Grey of Stanford Law School, and Peter Quint of the University of M3I)"
land Law School for their generous comments on early drafts of this article.
I See generally Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1985); Law and Literature
Symposium, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373 (1982); Suretsky, Search for a Theory: An Annotated Bibliography of Writings on the Relation of Law to Literature and the Humanities. 32 Rutgers L.
Rev. 727 (1979).
2 See, e.g., Weisberg, How Judges Speak: Some Lessons on Adjudication in Billy Budd.
Sailor with an Application to Justice Rehnquisl, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. I (1982); Kumer, Capital
in Hell: Dante's Lesson on Usury. 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 608 (1979). Shakespeare appears to
evoke the most interest among legal scholars. See, e.g., Gohn, Richard II: Shakespeare's Legal
Brief on the Royal Prerogative and the Succession to the Throne, 70 Gee. L.J. 943 (1982);
Note, Shakespeare and the Legal Process: Four EssaYS. 61 Va. L. Rev. 390 (1975).
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persistently employ narrative plots at strategic points in their arguments.
relating romantic sagas about mythical commanders and communities
and saturating their writings with realistic anecdotes from lawyers' and
judges' subjective experiences of law.) Fictive protagonists also play an
important role in legal theory: Dworkin's heroic "Herculean" judge and
Holmes's one-dimensional "bad man," for example, are central devices
by which these jurists convey their conceptions of the meaning of law.
It is not surprising that legal theory should rely so heavily upon
narrative form. The subject matter of legal theory is the "nature of law."
This nature is partly revealed by the content of law-its history and
political and economic underpinnings. Examining law as a "fact" can
help us understand what law is and what it has been in the past. But law
is also an ever-present possibility, potentially bringing good or evil into
our future. The nature of law is also revealed, then, by our aspirations
for and our fear of law: fantasies and nightmares revolving around
power, reason, and authority. When we discuss what is, we rely quite
rightly upon description and analysis. But when we discuss what is possible, what we desire and what we dread, we quite naturally tum to stories about hypothetical communities and the legal actors and forms
within those communities.
If legal theories are, in part, aesthetic objects, then we should be
trying to understand them in that sense. This Article argues that the
narrative plots, protagonists, and images of major legal theories do, in
fact, fall into recognizable literary categories. It develops this thesis by
applying to legal theory the insights of a classic work of literary criticism,
Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism. 4 In this work, Frye, premiere
J See, e.g., B. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980) (twenty.first century
spaceship community); J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legisla.
tion, in I The Works of Jeremy Bentham I, 146 n.t (J. Bowring ed. 1838·1843 &. photo.
reprint 1962) (using anecdote to illustrate wisdom of ordinary citizens); R. Dworkin, Taking
Rights Seriously 105·SO (1977) (Herculean judge); J. Frank, Law and the Modem Mind I()()'
17 (1931) (tales of the judging process); L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 33·38 (1964) (King
Rex): O.W. Holmes, The Common Law (1881) (narrating the story of Anglo-American law's
development); Dworkin, What is Equality7 Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 Phil. .t Puh. Air.
283, 285·87 (1981) (shipwreck survivors on desert island); Frank, What Courts 00 in Fact
(pts. 1-2),26 Ill. L. Rev. 64S, 761 (1932) (witty, often anecdotal discussion of judicial process
and hypothetical cases); Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 Harv. L Rev. 616
(1949); Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Nohle
Dream, 11 Ga. L. Rev. 969 (1977) (portraying American adjudication as beset hy two extreme
illusions); Holmes. The Path of the Law, 10 HIlJ'V. L. Rev. 457, 459·62 (1897) (the bad man);
Hutcheson, The Judgment Initiative: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Dcc:ision, 14
Cornell LQ. 274 (1929) (reIatingjudge's experiences).
.. N. Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (1957). For an application of Frye's narrative categories
to the writings of nineteenth-century historians, see H. White, Metahistory: The Historical
imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe (1973).

HeinOnline -- 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 146 1985

Imaged with the Pennission of N.Y.U. Law Review

May 1985]

JURISPRUDENCE AS NARRATIVE

147

"formalist" literary critic, 5 demonstrates that four discrete "aesthetic
myths" recur in the common plots of poems, movies, novels, plays,
comic strips, and other narrative forms. Two of the myths reflect contrasting me/hods of storytelling: romantic and ironic narrative modes. 6
The other two reflect contrasting visions of the world: comic and tragic
world views. 7
Two similar polarities dominate modem jurisprudence. The first
polarity concerns conflicting theories of law as either an exercise of reason or an exercise of the will. The second involves conflicting images of
law as either a liberating force serving the community or an oppressive
tool serving the interests of the powerful. The two theories and the two
images have generated four major jurisprudential traditions: natural law,
positivism, liberalism, and statism. This Article establishes a correlation
between these four major jurisprudential traditions and the four aesthetic
myths that Frye identified as permeating great and popular literature.
The natural lawyer's and the legal positivist's me/hods of analyzing law
fit readily within Frye's descriptions of romantic and ironic narrative
method. The liberal and the statist's contrasting visions of law can be
read as instances of comic and tragic narrative visions.
Part I of this Article summarizes Northrop Frye's analysis of the
role of myth in narrative literature and reviews his four "core myths"
and their corresponding literary plots: romance, irony, comedy, and
tragedy. Part II describes four corresponding jurisprudential traditions:
natural law, legal positivism, liberalism, and statism. Parts III and IV
argue that each of these jurisprudential traditions is unified by either a
vision of the world or a narrative method that corresponds to one of
Frye's four literary myths. The final section assesses the significance of
this correspondence, demonstrating that it is fruitful to address conflicts
in legal theory as reflecting aesthetic as well as political and moral differ5 Frye has been called "the leading theoretician orlitenuy criticism among all those writing in English today." Bloom, A SlUdy or the Structure or Romance (Book Review), N.Y.
Times, Apr. 18, 1976, § 7, at 21; see also R. Denham, Northrop Frye and Critical Method vii
(1978). Frye's books and essays on literature are discussed in Northrop Frye in Modem Criticism: Selected Papers rrom the English Institute (M. Krieger ed. 1966); see also R. Denham,
supra. For a discussion or Frye's rormalism, see Part V(B) inrra.
Some critics have attacked Frye's analysis or literature in Anatomy o/Cn"icism because or
what they perceive to be the inconsistency with which Frye practices his general rerusal to pass
judgment on the quality or the works he discusses. Frye's work has also been criticized for its
abstract treatment or literatlll'e, a treatment that is said to ignore the details or individual
works and to pay little attention to their historical and social contexts. See Winsatt, Northrop
Frye: Criticism as Myth, in Northrop Frye in Modem Criticism: Selected Papers rrom the
English Institute, supra; Dickstein, U. and Non-V. (Book Review), 36 Partisan Rev. 153
(1969) (reviewing N. Frye, The Modem Century (1969)).
(, N. Frye, supra note 4, at lSI-58.
7 Id. at 141-50.
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eoces in the way we view the world. By so doing, we may achieve a
better understanding of who we are and wby we disagree.
I
FRYE'S FOUR MYTHS OF NARRATIVE LITERATURE

Frye distinguishes four "organizations" of archetypal symbolism in
literature. s First, he describes two "undisplaced" narrative myths9 reflecting visions of the world that are expressed in the comic and tragic
poles of literature. These myths take the form of "two contrasting
worlds of total metaphorical identification, one desirable and the other
undesirable." 10 Frye calls these the "apocalyptic" and the "demonic,"
and they can be illustrated by popular conceptions of heaven and hell. 11
The second two organizations are literary methods by which the undisplaced myths are "analogized" to the actual human world; these methods find expression in romantic and ironic narrative forms. The first
analogical method is that of "innocence." By the "analogy of innocence," the pure, undisplaced apocalyptic myth is changed into story by
the medium of metaphor. The second analogical method is that of "experience." By the "analogy of experience" the pure, undisplaced demonic
myth is translated into story by the medium of realism. 12
In the apocalyptic undisplaced myth (the comic pole), human as
well as divine civilizations flourish. The apocalyptic world is an idealized, indivisible unity, in which God is "One Christ," the members of a
political community are of "one body," and lovers unite as "one flesh."13
Community, in its various forms, is infinitely desirable, a natural good, as
is the human transformation of nature through work. 14
8 Id. at 139.
9 "Undisplaced myths" arc narratives that have retained their mythic subject matter and
have not been made into "plausible. symmetrical, and moraUy acceptable" siories for a modem
audience. See id. at 136-38.
10 Id. at 139.
II Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 142-43.
14 See id. at 141.
The apocalyptic world, the heaven of religion, presents... the categories of reality
in the fonns of human desire, as indicated by the forms they assume under the work of
human civilizalion. The fonn imposed by human work and desire on the vegetable
world, for instance, is that of the garden, the fann, the grove, or the park. The human
fonn of tbe animal world is a world of domesticated animals, of which the sheep has a
traditional priority in both Classical and Christian metaphor. The human form of the
mineral world, the form into which human work transfonns stone, is tbe dty. The dty,
the garden and tbe sheepfold are the organizing metaphors of the Bible and of most
Christian symbolism, and they are brought into complete metaphorical identification in
the book explicidy called the Apocalypse or Revelation, which has been carefully
designed 10 fonn an undisplaced mythical conclusion for the Bible as a whole.
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In sharp contrast, the "demonic myth" (the tragic pole) presents
"the world that desire totally rejects."15 Although the demonic world
also has divine, social, and sexual aspects, each aspect is divisive, menacing, and horrific. The "world that desire totally rejects" is a world in
which we are divided and isolated. 16
Frye's third and fourth "organizing forms" of myth are his two
"analogies," the narrative methods by which the undisplaced apocalyptic
and demonic myths are translated into worldly, recognizable phenomena. The undisplaced apocalyptic myth is translated by the "analogy of
innocence" into an idealized, romantic world. In this narrative method
ofromance,I7 apocalypse is "made real" by the romantic idealization of
reality.18 The undisp]aced demonic myth is translated to the world via
the "analogy of experience," or the "method of realism."19 Use of the
Id. at 141.
IS Jd. at 147. Frye describes the demonic world as follows:
(T)he world of the nightmare and the scapegoat, of bondage and pain and confusion; the world as it is before the human imagination begins to work on it and before any
image of human desire, such as the city or the garden, has been solidly established; the
world also of perverted or wasted work, ruins and catacombs, instruments of torture and
monuments offoDy. Andjust as apocalyptic imagery in poetry is closely associated with
a religious heaven, so its dialectic opposite is closely linked with an existential hell, like
Dante's Inferno, or with the heD that man creates on earth, as in 1984, No Exit and
Darkness at Noon, where the titles of the last two speak for themselves.
ld.
16 Id.
The demonic human world is a society held together by a kind of molecular tension
of egos, a loyalty to the group or the leader which diminishes the individual, or. at best,
contrasts his pleasure with his duty or honor. Such a society is an endless source of
tragic dilemmas like those of HamIet and Antigone. . . . In the sinister human world
one individual pole is the tyrant-leader, inscrutable, ruthless, melancholy, and with an
insatiable will, who commands loyalty only if he is egocentric enough to represent the
collective ego of his followers. The other pole is represented by the phaTnakos or sacrificed victim, who has to be killed to strengthen the others.
Id. at 147-48.
17 Yd. at lSI-54.
18 The mode of romance presents an idealized world: in romance heroes are brave, heroines
beautiful, villains villainous, and the frustrations, ambiguities, and embarrassments of
ordinary life are made little or. . ..
In the analogy of innocence the divine or spiritual figures are usually parental, wise
old men with magical powers like Prospera, or friendly guardian spirits like Raphael
before Adam's fall. Among the human figures children are prominent, and so is the
virtue most closely associated with childhood and the state of innocence-chastity, a
virtue which in this structure of imagery usually includes virginity.
Id. at 151.
Cilies are more alien to the pastoral and rural spirit of this world and the tower and
Ihe castle, with an occasional cottage or hermitage, are the chief images of habitation.
Id. al 152.
19 Id. al 154-55.
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analogy of experience defines what may be called the "ironic mode."20
Frye generates from these four organizing myths-the apocalyptic,
the demonic, the romantic, and the ironic-four thematic categories:
We have thus answered the question: are there narrative categories of literature broader than, or logically prior to, the ordinary literary genres? There are four such categories: the romantic, the tragic,
the comic, and the ironic or satiric. . . . We thus have four narrative
pregeneric elements of literature which I shall call mythoi or generic
plots.
If we think of our experience of these mythoi. we shall realize that
they form two opposed pairs. Tragedy and comedy contrast rather
than blend, and so do romance and irony, the champions respectively
of the ideal and the actual. On the other hand, comedy blends insensibly into satire at one extreme and into romance at the other; romance
may be comic or tragic; tragic extends from high romance to bitter and
ironic realism. 21
Frye's four "pregeneric myths" can be schematized in the following

way:
(Apocalyptic Myth of Unity and Community)

COMEDY

(Analogy of Innocence)

(Analogy of Experience)

RoMANCE-------~f_-------IRONY

TRAGEDY
(Demonic Myth of Disunity and Alienation)
20 [This] treatment of human society reflects •.. Wordsworth's doctrine thai the essential
human situations, for the poet, are the common and typical ones. Along with this goes a
good deal of parody of the idealization of life in romance, a parody that extends to
religious and aesthetic experience. . . . Gardens . . . give place to fanns and the pain.
ful labor of the man with the hoc, the peasant or furu: cutler who stands in Hardy as an
image of man himself, "slighted and enduring." Cities take of course the shape of the
labyrinthine modem metropolis, where th e main emotional stress is on loneliness and
Jack of communication.
Id.
21 Id. at 162.
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Frye then distinguishes "phases" within each of his four categories.
Because romance "blends" into comedy and tragedy, there are phases of
romance that are also phases of tragedy or of comedy. Similarly, some of
the borderline phases of irony are also phases of comedy at one extreme,
and of tragedy at the other. Frye's conception of the mythoi also can be
schematized:
(Apocalyptic Undisplaced Myth)
COMEDY
romantic
comedy

ironic
comedy

comic
romance

comic
lcony

(Method of Innocence)

(Method of Experience)

ROMANCE

IRONY

tragic
romance

tragic

irony
romantic
tragedy

ironic
tragedy
TRAGEDY

(Demonic Undisplaced Myth)

II
FOUR JURISPRUOENTIAL TRAomoNs

Frye's categorization of literary traditions according to view of the
world and method of narration can be easily fitted to AnglO-American
jurisprudence. That jurisprudence can be divided into four traditions,
rooted in polar responses to two recurrent questions in legal theory. The
first question is philosophical, and competing answers have generated
two methods of inquiry. The second question is empirical; the answers
have formed two visions of our legal world.
The philosophical question has both an analytical and a methodological dimension: What is the analytical relationship between law and
morality, and how methodologically do we distinguish legal from moral
HeinOnline -- 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 151 1985
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norms? Natural law and legal positivist responses to this question bear a
relation to each other comparable to the contrast Frye describes between
the romantic and ironic modes of narrative literature. which are concerned respectively with the ideal and the actual.
For the natural lawyer, true "law," by definition, must meet some
set of moral criteria: 22 to St. Augustine, for example, laws that ignore
the "eternal" law cannot be just and are therefore not true law. 2l Law
incorporates morality. and the "discovery" of law therefore requires the
"discovery" of true morality as wel1. 24 In aesthetic terms, the natural
lawyer employs a "romantic" jurisprudential method. Only in an imaginary apocalyptic world is his ultimate hope realized: only in heaven, or
apocalypse, do the legal "is" and the moral "ought" coincide perfectly.
Like Frye's romantic, the natural lawyer "analogizes" this apocalyptic
vision of a perfect convergence of law and morality to the imperfect
world we inhabit through the ahistorical, "innocent" techniques of metaphor: idealization, reason, and faith. Thus, Plato teaches that the "discovery of law," like the discovery of truth and beauty, is the reasoned
and nonexperiential grasping of a transcendent, ideal reality.2$ The naturallawyer's philosophical method, like the romantic's narrative method,
is theoretically pure and willfully counterfactual. Only moral law is
"true" law. Experience does not ground the theory and method of the
natural law tradition; innocence, faith, and reason do.
Legal positivists, conversely, propound an experiential method and
a realistic theory.26 Law is a historical/act. As such, it can be discovered only by the study of worldly phenomena. Thus, Austin teaches that
22 The natural law tradition begins with Plato, who defines law as the "discovery of true
reality." Plato, Mmo, at 73d (M. Brown ed. 1971). Other natural lawyers have claimed that
law must, in order to qualify as true "law," accord with moral nonns derived from God's law
(Augustine), human nature (Aquinas), rights (Dworkin), procedural fairness (Fuller), generality (Wechsler), neutrality (Ackennan), the buman good (Finnis), or the community good
(Aquinas and Aristotle). See B. Ackennan, supra nole 3; T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica 75151 (Questions 94-96) (f. Gilbeyed. 1964); R. Dworkin, supra note 3; I. Finnis, Natural Law
and Natural Rights (1980); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstilUtional Law, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959). But sec I. Finnis, supra, at 23-36 (the natura1law tradition does not
require denial of the separation of law from morality).
23 See H. Deane, The Politica1 and Social Ideas orSt. Augustine 89 (1963). During the last
40 years of his life, however, Augustine never addressed the proper response to "unjust" ternporallaws. He did not suggest that such laws were invalid or that they could be disobeyed.
Id. at 90-91.
24 Augustine's radical assertion is repeated in a milder fonn in T. Aquinas, supra note 22,
at 130-33 (Question 96, Reply to Point 4).
2S Plato, supra note 22, at 73d.
26 See generally Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev.
593 (1958) [hereinafter Hart, Positivism]; Hart, Problems of Philosophy of Law, 6 Encyclopedia of Philosophy 264-76 (1967) [hereinafter Han, Problems).
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law is the "command of the sovereign, "27 Holmes that law is "what the
courts will do in fact."28 The positivists' jurisprudential method is comparable to Frye's "ironic" narrative method; like Frye's literary ironists,
legal positivists "analogize" their demonic vision to our world by reference to contingent truths born of experience.29 Only that which is observable, is. Experience and skepticism, not faith and reason, ground
positivist theory and method.
The second group of basic questions of concern to modem legal theory is empirical. What is the historical relationship between law and morality? Do legal systems tend to satisfy moral criteria or do they tend to
be evil? Do they serve forces of liberation or forces of oppression? These
are questions about history, human nature, and human societies. The
extreme visions underlying the contrasting responses to these questions
correlate with the apocalyptic and demonic myths that Frye argues underlie comic and tragic narrative plots.
One of these empirical views echoes Frye's undisplaced demonic
myth. In light of the brutality of modem history, it is certainly possible
to conclude that positive legal systems more often than not fail to meet
even minimal moral criteria, whether the criteria are Kantian,30 Augustinian,3t or utilitarian. 32 Like Frye's tragedian, the statist views this history of brutality and oppression as the "experiential analogue" of our
demonic human predicament. 33 The misery heaped upon human beings
by human beings, through law and lawlessness both, makes perfect sense
to the tragic legal theorist; it is hell on earth. Racial, religious, political,
and sexual oppression and violence are not perversions of our nature;
they are the foreseeable ends of our natural propensity for brutality.
At the other aesthetic extreme, the liberal theorist 34 concludes from
27 J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Detennined and The Uses of the Study of
Jurisprudence 13·14 (Humanities ed. 1965).
28 Holmes, supra note 3, at 461.
29 See Hart, Problems, supra note 26, at 272·73.
30 See, e.g., I. Kant, The Philosophy of Law 0'1. Hastie ed. 1887).
)t See, e.g., H. Deane, supra note 23.
12 See, e.g., J. Bentham, or Laws in General 31·33 (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1970).
)1 See, e.g., Radbruch, Legal Philosophy, in The Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch,
and Dabin 43, 112·20 (K. Wilk trans. 1950).
:w The liberal stale in our culture is distinguisbed rrom the conservative nol by a neutral
stance toward particular definitions of the good life, as Dworkin and Ackenoan have sug·
gested. but by the manner in which the "good life" is defined, ascertained, and pursued. Un·
like conservatives, liberals are committed to a natura1istic, evolving conception of the good life,
rather than a moralistic and static one. As a result, they are committed to an experimental,
inductive method of understanding. Liberalism's aim, then, is a naturalistic conception of the
good life that is empirically understood and ultimately accessible to all members of the com·
munity. These "constitutive goals" sometimes imply a strategy of state neutrality toward the
nalUre of Ihat life and sometimes require the contrary. Whether or not state neutrality is
required by liberal commitments depends upon contingent and temporal conditions. But liber·
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history that legal systems and the societies they control tend to improve
morally, not degenerate, over time. 3 ' Auschwitz, El Salvador, and oppression are aberrational; community. progress, and altruism reveal our
truer nature. Although imperfect, modem democratic governments do
what they ought to do: promote the community's happiness, treat people
as ends rather than means, maximize individual freedoms. respect personal autonomy. and encourage community. Aesthetically, these optimistic assessments of recent history, human nature, and law share an
"apocalyptic" vision of human potential and current reality. It follows
naturally from the communitarian and progressive assumptions of liberalism that laws do, can, and will promote human welfare; if community
is natural and good, then laws and legality are simply a natural and good
feature of that human enterprise. The same kind of assumptions, Frye
argues, underlies comedy. Liberal, democratic, and humane societies
and legal systems appear natural from the aesthetic vantage point of the
apocalyptic myth.
These four jurisprudential positions correlate, then, with Frye's fundamental narrative plots. Romantic and ironic narrative modes mirror
the natural law and positivist methods in jurisprudence. Comic and
tragic narrative visions correspond to liberal and demonic or statist
world views, respectively.
But just as narrators combuie vision with method,l6 legal theorists
typically combine either a "romantic" or "ironic" theoretical method
with either a "comic" or "tragic" vision of the world. Both the natural
lawyer and the positivist may harbor either a demonic or an apocalyptic
vision of history and of human society. Similarly, a liberal may employ
either a romantic or an ironic jurisprudential method, as may a statist.
The combinations of theoretical method and historical vision yield jurisprudential positions, which in turn correlate with the "phases" Frye finds
within his narrative plots.
The natural lawyer who discovers that much of what currently operates as "law" does not morally qualify as such will be prompted to deny
the law's ultimate Validity. As Ely notes, for example, our revolutionary
Declaration of Independence, unlike the Constitution, is penneated with
natural law concepts that deny the validity of the British law of its
time. l7 A romantic method coupled with an awareness of the tragic failalism itself does not require neutrality; at most, gi ... en liberal premises, wnditions may at ....ri·
ous times suggest the wisdom of stale neutrality. See West, Uberalism Redisco ... ered: A
Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision. 46 U. Pitt. L. Re .... 673 (1985),
JS See, e.g., Hart, Law in the Perspecti ...eofPhilosophy: 1776-1976.51 N.V.V. L. Rev. 538
(1976).
36 N. Frye, supra note 4, at 131-40.
31 See J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Re ... iew 49 (1980).
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ings of particular states, rulers, or laws is in fact the shared aesthetic
stance of the eighteenth-century revolutionary, the twentieth-century
civil disobedient, and the transcendentalist visionary.38
Alternatively, the natural lawyer who sees in the present world a
legal system that generally comports with moral criteria will be
prompted to assert the essential morality of the law-the "rightness" of
extant power. Romantic method coupled with a comic contentment with
the present world is the aesthetic stance of the political reactionary.39
Law becomes a moral good, which therefore ought to be obeyed, simply
because it is law.
Like the natural lawyer, the positivist combines a method-an experiential insistence on the facts-with a view of the world. At the cost of
symmetry, one can distinguish three jurisprudential and pOlitical positions. First, a positivist may combine an experiential historical method
with an apocalyptic vision of the world, believing that our legal system is
generally good, adequately reflecting both our tolerance of diversity and
our social inclination to community. A positivist methodology coupled
with a rational belief in human goodness and social progress forms the
comic-ironic aesthetic position of the reformer. It underlies the optimism of liberal and progressive theorists, from the Benthamites through
the New Deal lawyers and the American legal realists. 40 Second, the positivist may perceive a demonic reality but nevertheless harbor an apocalyptic vision of our potential for a communitarian future. Our social
isolation and alienation are a consequence of changeable and perverse
present institutions, not evidence of an essentially atomistic human personality. Because of the wide gap between present reality and social potential, however, radical action, not liberal progress, is all that can
deliver us to the promised land. This aesthetic posture-dark, ironic
comedy, tinged with awareness of the demonic--characterizes the
criticial legal studies movement."l Finally, at the most tragic extreme,
the positivist method can combine with a thoroughly demonic assessment of the world, present and future: law is the will of the powerful and
morality does not exist. The modern "law and economics" movement,
despite its liberal window dressing, has its roots in this combination of
scientific method with a tragic assessment of our communal potential. 42
Similarly, liberal and statist theorists may also tend toward either an
ironic or romantic methodology. A liberal outlook coupled with a romantic methodology results in a reactionary acceptance of the status quo
38 See text accompanying
39 See tellt accompanying
40 See tellt accompanying
41 See text accompanying
42 See text accompanying

notcs
notcs
notes
notes
notcs

52·56 infra.
57-72 infra.
94-116 infra.
117-32 infra.
13346 infra.
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based upon idealized and static assumptions about human nature. 43 By
contrast, liberalism coupled with experiential realism yields an acceptance of OUf social world based upon changing facts of experience.""
Statism tending toward irony posits only relentless cruelty and sUffering
as the essence of human experience.4 ! Statism combined with a romantic
methodology simultaneously posits a demonic present and an idyllic alternative world: either an afterlife or a postrevolutionary paradise on
earth.46
These positions can be correlated with Frye's literary categories:
Liberalism
COMEDY

(Apocalyptic vision of a natural convergence of law and morality)

CONSERVATIVE/REACfIONARY

REFORMER/RADICAL

Positivism

Natural Law
ROMANCE--- - - - - - - - - - - - t -- - - - - -- - - ----

IRONY

(Ironic vision of an
analytic separation
of law and morality)

(Romantic vision of an
analytic connection of
law and morality
VISIONARY /REVOLUTIONARY

RESIGNATION

Statism
TRAGEDY

(Demonic vision of a natural divergence of law and morality)

Just as Frye's literary themes blend at their boundaries with the
themes they border, so these jurisprudential schools "blend" with each
other in their more extreme phases. Natural law tends to embrace either
a reactionary or a revolutionary plan of action, depending upon the
.) See text accompanying notes 115·86 infra.
44 See text accompanying Dotes 181·95 inrra.
See text accompanying notes 198·201 infra.
46 See lext accompanying noles 208-10 infra.

4S
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world view with which it is coupled. Positivism tends toward either a
progressive or regressive stance. An apocalyptic view of human nature
can be influenced by either a positivist insistence upon an experiential
method, or a romantic insistence on an idealized methodology. Finally,
a demonic vision of human society and legal institutions may be coupled
with either a positivist resignation to the status quo or a revolutionary
aspiration to a transcendental reality. The major strands of jurisprudential thought thus can be depicted:
(Liberalism)

COMEDY
Comic/Ironic

ComiclRomantic
Individualism
Constitutionalism

Legal Realism
Critical Legal
Studies

Social
Pragmatism

Romantic/Comic

Ironic/Comic

ROMANCE---------------*e---------------IRONY
(Natural Law)

(Legal Positivism)

Revolution, Civil
Disobedience

Hobbes, Law &
Economics

Romantic/
Tragic
Sophocles

Sophistry

Ironic/
Tragic

Tragic/Ironic

Tragic/Romantic

TRAGEDY
Statism

Thus, as romance blends with tragedy at one extreme and comedy at
the other, natural law blends with revolutionary rhetoric on the one side
and a reactionary constitutionalism and individualism on the other. As
comedy blends into either romance or irony, liberalism blends with a
romantic equation of the "is" and the "ought" on the one side, and a
realistic insistence on their separation on the other. As irony borders
upon comedy and tragedy, legal positivism borders upon liberalism and
statism. FinaUy, as tragedy ranges from irony to romance, statism moves
from an exhausted realism to inspiration and revolution, closing the
circle.
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The next two Parts of this Article discuss each of the four major
jurisprudential categories. from the contrasting methods of romance and
irony to the contrasting visions of comedy and tragedy. First, the "ram~
ily resemblance" between the major jurisprudential commitments of each
jurisprudential category and the dominant characteristics of its correlative narrative myth are examined. Then the central ambiguity of each
jurisprudential category is identified, along with the two major subcategories that the ambiguity entails. Finally. each jurisprudential category
is correlated with the " phases" Frye identifies within each narrative plot.
The ambiguity within each philosophical tradition will be discussed in
aesthetic terms, for these aesthetic differences have generated much of
our modem jurisprudential debate.
III
NARRATIVE MODES AND JURISPRUDENTIAL METHODS

A.

Romance and Natural Law: Good Guys, Bad Guys,
and the Rule of Law
Romantic narrative, Frye explains, is characteristically dominated
by the description of a mythic quest for an idyllic world. 47 In romance,
heroes are triumphant and rewarded, villains are punished, the comfortable and impeccably moral status quo is restored, and all is right in the
end-as it was at the start. The hero embodies moral virtue, and he and
it emerge victorious. By the end of the narrative, power and right have
inevitably converged.48
.7 N. Frye, supra note 4, at 186-87.
• 8 Id. at 187.
This major adventure, the element that gives literary fonn to the romance, [is] the
quest. . . . A quest involving conflict assumes two main characters, a protagonist or
hero, and an antagonist or enemy. . . . The enemy may be an ordinary human being,
but the nearer the romance is to myth, the more attributes of divinity will cling to the
hero and the more the enemy will take on demonic mythical qualities. The central fonn
of romance is dialectical; everything is focused on a conflict between the hero and his
enemy, and all the reader's values are bound up with the hero. Hence the hero of romance is analogous to the mythical Messiah or deliverer who comes from an upper
world, and his enemy is analogous to the demonic powers of a lower world. The conflict
however takes place in, or at any rate primarily concerns, our world . . . . The enemy is
associated with winter, darkness, confusion, sterility, moribund life, and old age, and the
hero with spring, dawn, order, fertility, vigor, and youth.
Id. at 187-88.
The characterization of romance follows its general dialectic structure, which means
that subtlety and complexity are not much favored. Characters lend to be either for or
against the quest. If they assist it they are idealized as simply gallant or pure; if they
obstruct it they are caricatured as simply villainous or cowardly. Hence every typical
character in romance tends to have his moral opposite confronting him, like black and
white pieces in a chess game.
Id. at 195.
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Frye explains that romance has both a "proletarian" and a "chivalric" aspect. 49 These elements correlate, in tum, with romance's tragic
and comic phases. Tragic (proletarian) romance parallels tragedy's
theme of disunification: the hero is inevitably and irretrievably alienated
from the community, despite the hero's hope and the narrators promise
of an ultimate communion. In the tragic phases of romantic narrative.
heroic strength and moral virtue are pitted against the corrupt values of a
dominant social group. Consequently, Frye explains, the tragic phases of
romance explore revolutionary themes: tumultuous endings and new beginnings make room for at least the description, if not the fruition, of
new utopias.
Comic romance, by contrast, celebrates the moral virtue of the dominant social group: the heroic and virtuous protagonist protects the
group against assault from outsiders. Romance in these phases parallels
comedy's "unification" theme: the hero and his society are united in purpose and outlook. The identification of heroic strength and moral virtue
serves to reinforce, not overthrow, the values and cohesion of the extant
social group. In the most comic phases, the group to be defended is
either the society as a whole or some slice of it. sO
Schematically, romantic narrative "blends" at one extreme with
tragedy. and at the other with comedy:
49

The romance is nearest of all literary fonns to the wish-fulfillment dream, and for that
reason it has socially a curiously paradoxical role. In every age the ruling social or
inteUectual class tends to project its ideals in some fonn of romance, where the virtuous
heroes and beautiful heroines represent the ideals and the villains the threats to their
ascendancy. nus is the general character of chivalric romance in the Middle Ages.
aristocratic romance in the Renaissance, bourgeois romance since the eighteenth century, and revolutionary romance in contemporary Russia. Yet there is a genuinely "proletarian" element in romance too which is never satisfied with its various incarnations,
and in fact the incarnations themselves indicate that no matter how great a change may
take place in society. romance will turn up again. as hungry as ever. looking for new
hopes and desires to feed on. The perennially childlike quality of romance is marked by
its extraordinarily persistent nostalgia, its search for some kind of imaginative golden
age in time or space.

Id. at 186.
so See id. at 201·.()2.
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COMEDY

Comedic
Romance

ROMANCE - - - - - - - /
(Method of Innocence)

Tragedic
Romance

TRAGEDY

Natural law scholarship. like romantic narrative, is dominated by a
moral quest. "Law" is the natural lawyer's romantic hero: it is morally
virtuous and historically triumphant-it is "sovereign." "Law" embodies both virtue and power. Like the narrator's portrayal of the romantic
hero, every natural lawyer defines "law" or "legality" so that the defining
attributes of a truly "legal" sovereignty are themselves "moral" qualities.
Such attributes then morally legitimate as well as define the sovereign's
political power. Thus, the political monarch is both sovereign and
moral, because divine anointment ensures the justice as well as the power
of a monarchical regime. Similarly, the Constitution is both sovereign
and moral because of its defining attribute; the "higher law" content of
its substantive provisions, its history, and its traditions both morally legitimate and define a constitutional regime. The natural lawyer defines
law in such a way as to ensure the moral worth of legal supremacy. just
as the narrator of a romantic fiction describes the hero in such a way as
to ensure the moral worth of his inevitable victory.
Romantic narrative, Frye explains, serves a "curiously paradoxical
role" in society.'1 Natural law scholarship exhibits the same "paradoxical" range found in romantic narrative, moving between a reactionary
endorsement of the legal status quo and a revolutionary rejection of it.
The natural lawyer's insistence that law, properly defined, incorporates
the demands of morality entails either a "chivalric" conclusion-the necessary morality of the current regime--or the "revolutionary" conclusion-the immorality and hence illegality of the regime. Either the
51 Id. at 186.
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Prince is necessarily good because of his divine anointment-the chivalric conclusion-or, if he is bad, he was not divinely anointed and therefore is necessarily not a Prince-the revolutionary conclusion. These
conclusions correlate with the comic and tragic phases of the natural law
tradition. Whereas the comic natural lawyer sees virtue in existing
power relations, the tragedian finds such virtue only in his "dream" of an
idealized or future world. The tragedian thus calls insistently for a revolutionary struggle toward an idyllic future paradise.
Both the chivalric and revolutionary traditions have heavily influenced American legal romanticism. The chivalric inference of morality
from the fact of power is reflected in law reviews and constitutional literature, as well as popular thinking on law. At the other extreme, the
revolutionary inference from the immorality of power to its illegality is a
foundation of revolutionary literature. 52 Schematically, American natural law literature covers the same substantive range as romantic
narrative:
LIBERALISM

(Comedy)

Blackstone's Common Law,
Constitutionalism,
Individualism
(Ahistorical correlation
of existing lawful power
with morality}-chivalric
view

NATURAL L A W - - - - - - - I

(Romance)
(Ahistorical identification of
law and morality)
Revolution, Civil
Disobedience,
Transcendentalism
(Identification of
counterfactual but
ideal law with
morality)-revolutionary
"iew

STATISM

(Tragedy)
52 See, e.g., T. Paine. Common Sense, in 1 The Writings of Thomas Paine 67 (M.D. Con·
way ed. 1894-1896 & photo. reprint 1972); T. Paine, Rights of Man, in 2 The Writings of
Thomas Paine 265 (M.D. Conway ed. 1894-1896 & photo. reprint 1972).
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Tragic Romance: Of Rebirth and Revolution

Law review scholarship only occasionally explores tragic-romantic
themes. This absence is striking although not inexplicable. Legal scholars do not often seek tumultuous changes, new beginnings and endings,

or transcendent utopias. Such scholarship lacks the preconditions of
tragic romance: an apocalyptic vision of the future, a perception of the
present as a living hell, and an innocent, idealistic, ahistorica1 insistence
that we can somehow transcend history to achieve utopia. The perceptions of scholars are less epic and their goals more timid.
American legal literature more broadly defined, however, rests solidly on a tragic-romantic narrative base. The Declaration of Independence-our document of "tumultuous birth"---employs natural law logic
profoundly tinged with tragic-romantic aesthetic imagery. The Declaration distinguishes true "law" from the commands of the existing sovereign or of the existing state, defining the former as a transcendent quality
that can only be freed by revolutionary action. Law is the justice inherent in our power of reason, not in our will. As narrative, the document
tells the romantic story of the "birth of a hero," a tumultuous ending and
a new apocalyptic beginning. The American Rule of Law is the hero that
triumphs over English monarchical authority. The parental authority
figures are overthrown and replaced by a lawful, nonparental, and freer
political utopia, an orderly society of "desirable law" in which the free
and the brave, through heroic and individual action, can exploit the
apocalyptic land of milk and honey ..53
The narrative structure and the aesthetic imagery of apocalyptic
writings are drawn upon heavily, if subconsciously, during every period
of radical change. The civil rights movement provides the most recent
instance of this reliance. Like the revolutionary, Martin Luther King, Jr.
distinguishes law from power,54 defining the former as a transcendent
quality released only by revolutionary action. King identifies law not
with reason, however, but with love, emphatically echoing the heavenly
identification of sovereignty with love that characterizes the undisplaced
apocalyptic myth. Aesthetically, King relies almost exclusively on the
tragic-romantic imagery of the Declaration of Independence and of the
Bible. King's dream, like Biblical narrative and the story told in the
Declaration, is the story of a hero's moral battle against the demonic
world in which we presently live, and toward the "blessed community"
of which we are capable. The American dream of freedom and brother~) See J. Billington, Fire in the Minds of Men: Origins of the Revolutionary Faith 9
(1980).
54 King embraced the natura1 law arguments of both Aquinas and Augustine. See M.L.
King, Letter from Birmingbam City Jail, in Why We Can't Wait 77-100 (1963).
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hood is the reality our utopia must contain; alienation and racism are the
reality from which we must be delivered."
In King's "blessed world," as in every apocalyptic community, the
anxieties of our real world have vanished: fertility is victorious over the
wasteland; food, drink, bread, and wine are plentiful, the male and female are united, and body and blood are one:
The dream is one of equality of opportunity, of privilege and
property widely distributed; a dream of a land where men will not take
necessities from the many to give luxuries to the few; a dream of a land
where men do not argue that the color of a man's skin detennines the
content of his character; a dream of a place where all our gifts and
resources are held not for ourselves alone but as instruments of service
for the rest of humanity; the dream of a country where every man will
respect the dignity and worth of all human personality, and men will
dare to live together as brothers. . . . Whenever it is fulfilled, we will
emerge from the bleak and desolate midnight of man's inhumanity to
man into the bright and glowing daybreak of freedom and justice for
all of God's children. . . .
It is a dream of a land where men of all races, of all nationalities,
and of all creeds can live together as brothers. The substance of the
dream is expressed in these sublime words, words lifted to cosmic proportions: "We hold these truths to be se1f-evident-that all men are
created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness." This is the dream.56

2.

Comic Romance and Constitutionalism

To the comic-romantic, the identification of power and morality is
neither a dream nor the future; it is our present reality. "Moral authority" is not just an object of desire; it is also the reality that we have and
must struggle to preserve. In tragic romance, the hero struggles against
the reigning power; in comic romance, the hero's virtue and power mir55 Jesus took over the phrase ·'the Kingdom or God," but He changed its meaning. He
refused entirely to be the kind of Messiah that his contemporaries expected. Jesus made
love the mark or sovereignty. Here we are left with no doubt as to Jesus' meaning. The
Kingdom of God will be a society in which men and women live as children of God
should live. It will be a kingdom controUed hy the law of love. . . . Many have attempted to say that the ideal of a better world will be worked out in the next world. But
Jesus taught men to say, "Thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven." Although the
world seems to be in a bad shape today. we must never lose raith in the power or God to
achieve his purpose.
M.L. King, What a Christian Should Think About the Kingdom of God (unpublished manuscript deposited at Boston Univer.;ity Library). quoted in K. Smith & L. Zepp, Search for the
Beloved Community: The Thinking of Martin Luther King, Jr. 129 (1974).
56 Address by M.L. King, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 28, 1963), quoted in K. Smith & L.
app, supra note 55, at 126-21.
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ror the community's dominant values. The hero's undertaking is to defend, not attack, the dominant social group and the values it embraces.

As a result, Frye explains, the comic-romantic narrator tends to
"hedge"-or identify-existing political power with divine or moral
attributes. 57
Not coincidentally. the "hedging" of legal authority with divine authority is also a central aesthetic metaphor in comic-romantic jurisprudence. 58 Of course, the comic natural lawyer no longer sees the "fire of
the angelic world blaz[ing] in the king's crown."59 But he does still seeor seek-the "angelic blaze" of moral legitimacy in other sources of sovereignty. In American romantic jurisprudence, it is usually the constitutionalist who sees the "angelic blaze" in existing power. For the
constitutionalist, unlike the revolutionary, legal authority is hedged with
right; the romantic identification of law with right is characteristic both
of the legal state of which we dream and of the legal state we must de~
fend. As divine ascension both defines and morally legitimates monar~
chical power, so constitutionalism and the Rule of Law define and
morally legitimate liberal, democratic, and constitutional power. 60
Romantic stories about how the Constitution came to embody
moral right take two familiar forms in jurisprudence: substantive and
procedural. The substantive story unambiguously romanticizes the doc~
umeDt's content. The constitutional provisions themselves, by virtue of
either some miracle or some highly improbable historical accident, embody true principles of morality. Corwin tells the story this way:
The attribution of supremacy to the Constitution on the ground
S7 We find (in romance] tbe ... tendency to idealize tbe human representatives or the
divine and the spirituaJ world. . . . Divinity hedges tbe King and the Courtly Love
mistress is a goddess; love or both is an educating and inrorming power which brings one
into unity with tbe spiritual and divine worlds. Thefire ofthe angelic world blazes in the
king's crown and the lady's eyes.
N. Frye, supra note 4, at 153 (emphasis added).
38 For example, Dworkin uses a "super-smart" judge as his ultimate legal sovereign. See
R. Dworkin, supm note 3, at 10S-30.
59 See note 57 supra.
tiO ConstitutionaJism's comic vision is in tension with the tragic mythology or the revolutionary. Unlike the revolutionary, the constitutionalist projects an explicit endonement of the
particular institutions tbat the document defines, and thus implicitly endorses the "integrated
body" of individuals empowered by tbe Constitution. The constitutionalist employs not only
the romantic fonn of the monarchist. but also the monarchist's optimistic faith in the good will
of the powerful. The revolutionary theorist, or the civil disobedient, does not share the constitutionalist's comic contentment.
King's tragic-romantic justification of civil disobedience, for eltample, contrasts with the
comic-romantic justification offered by Ronald Dworkin. King argues that an unjust law is
not a law because it is not in accord with our nature or with God's will, whereas Dworkin
argues that an unjust law is not a law, because it is unconstitutional. For Dworkin, the Constitution embodies political morality as well as positive legality; our sovereign is in fact the ideal.
R. Dworkin, supra note 3, at 81-130.
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solely of its rootage in popular will represents, however, a comparatively late outgrowth of American constitutional theory. Earlier the
supremacy accorded to constitutions was ascribed less to their putative
source than to their supposed content, to their embodiment of an essential and unchanging justice. The theory of law thus invoked . . .
predicate[s] certain principles of right and justice which are entitled to
prevail of their own intrinsic excellence, altogether regardless of the
attitude of those who wield the physical resources of the community.
Such principles were made by no human hands; indeed, if they did not
antedate deity itself, they still so express its nature as to bind and control it. They are external to all Will as such and interpenetrate all
Reason as such. They are eternal and immutable. In relation to such
principles, human laws are, when entitled to obedience save as to matters indifferent, merely a record or transcript and their enactment an
act not of will or power but one of discovery and declaration. 61
Frye teIls us that in comic romance, power accompanies moral right,62
and Corwin makes the point: "the legality of the Constitution, its
supremacy, and its claim to be worshipped, alike find common standing'
ground on the belief in a law superior to the will of human governors. "63
Although the stories Dworkin tells in Taking Rights Seriously 64
have kept the "legend of justice" alive, substantive constitutionalism generally has not fared well in the last half of this century.6S The overtly
romantic assertion that the Constitution somehow embodies Objective
moral truths-that constitutional power is the prerequisite of justicedoes not square with a historical, realistic disposition. It is as hard to
deny the humanity, and thus the fallibility, of the Constitution's authors
as to deny the humanity of the King.
But although this particular legend is now less popular, chivalric
romance itself thrives in legal theory. The accepted modern constitutionalist story is that the procedures the Constitution envisions, rather than
its substantive content, ensure the moral legitimacy of constitutional authority. According to the procedural story, "law," or constitutional sovereignty, is defined and legitimized not by particular constitutional
provisions, but by processes governed by reason-just as a monarch is defined and legitimated by the process of divine anointment. Although Lon
Fuller explored the parameters of procedural, chivalric romance,66 it was
61 Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (PL I), 42
Harv. L. Rev. 149, 152 (1928) (emphasis omitted).
61 N. Frye, supra nOle 4, at 201.
6) Corwin, supra nOle 61, at 153 (emphasis added in part).
64 R Dworkin, supra note 3.
6~ For illustrations of oonstitutionallawyers' movement away from the substantive model
and toward the procedural model, see, e.g., L. Fuller, supra nOle 3; Wechsler, supra note 22.
66 See L. Fuller, supra note 3.
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Herbert Wechsler who, as his use of statements by Justices Jackson and
Frankfurter illustrates, elevated the argument and the imagery to the
level of nearly pure myth:
"Liberty is not the mere absence of restraint. it is not a spontaneous product of majority rule. it is not achieved merely by lifting underprivileged classes to power, nor is it the inevitable by-product of
technological expansion. It is achieved only by a rule of law." Is it not
also what Mr. Justice Frankfurter must mean in calling upon judges
for "allegiance to nothing except the effort. amid tangled words and
limited insights. to find the path through precedent, through policy,
through history, to the best judgment that fallible creatures can reach
in that most difficult of all tasks: the achievement of justice between
man and man, between man and state, through reason called law"?67

As in the substantive story. Fuller and Wechsler's procedural constitutionalism, viewed as narrative, exudes a contentment with constitutional
institutions as well as a romantic insistence that, through constitutionalism, power and right converge:
Having said what I bave said, I certainly sbould add that I offer
no comfort to anyone who claims legitimacy in defiance of the courts.
This is tbe ultimate negation of all neutral principles, to take the benefits accorded by the constitutional system, including the national market and common defense, while denying it allegiance when a special
burden is imposed. That certainly is the antithesis 0/ law. 68

The analytic difference between the substantive and procedural theories turns on the degree of generality each theorist finds crucial to a
moral conception of law. The aesthetic difference between the two theories read as stories also turns on the degree of rationalist detachment
from experience that each embraces. Wechsler's story, unlike Corwin's
and perhaps unlike Dworkin's, falls in the most comic phases of romance. It is, to borrow Frye's terms, as "reflective, idyllic (a] view of
experience from above" as is possible; its mood is one of complete "contemplative withdrawal."69 As in the later works of Shakespeare, Wechsler's narrative voice shows a pronounced tendency "to the moral
stratification of characters. "70 His " arrangement of characters"-with
judges and legal thinkers on the top of the hierarchy-is "consistent with
the detached and contemplative [rationalist] view of society taken in this
phase. " 7 1 The judge is detached and contemplative; thus, in Wechsler's
67 Wechsler, supra note 22, at 16 (quoting R. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the Ameri·

can System of Government 76 (1955) and F. Frankfurter, Chief Justice; I Have Known, in Of
Law and Men 158 (p. Elman ed. 1956» (emphasis added).
68 Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
69 N. Frye, supra note 4, at 202.
70
71

Id.
Jd.
HeinOnline -- 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 166 1985

Imaged with the

Pe nni ~si on

or N.Y.U. Law Review

May 1985J

JURISPRUDENCE AS NARRATIVE

167

narrative, the judge clearly embodies the Rule of Law.12
3.

The Appeal of Romance

Why does chivalric romanticism persist, either in narrative literature or in jurisprudence? Frye attributes its persistence partly to its political function-comic romance reinforces the chivalric morality of the
socially powerful. 73 The same is clearly true of jurisprudence: as Bentham noted, the natural lawyer's identification of law with a higher morality almost always serves the ends of the powerful.74 The claim to
virtue legitimates the claim to power. This accommodation no doubt
accounts in part for the durability of the natural law tradition.
Shakespeare provides a lovely example of this phenomenon in Richord II. As long as "Heaven guards the right," and as long as King Richard is the deputy elected by the Lord, Richard cannot be deposed, nor is
there any reason he should be. Richard himself makes the argument:
So when this thief, this traitor Bolingbroke,
Who all this while hath reveled in the nigh
Whilst we were wand'ring with the Antipodes,
Shall see us rising in our throne, the east,
His treasons will sit blushing in his face.
Not able to endure the sight of day,
But self-affrighted tremble at his sin.
Not all the water in the rough rude sea
Can wash the balm off from an annointed King.
The breath of worldly men cannot depose
The deputy elected by the Lord.
For every man that Bolingbroke hath press'd
To lift shrewd steel against our golden crown,
God for his Richard hath in heavenly pay
A glorious angel. Then, if angels fight,
Weak men must fall, for heaven still guards the right. 7S

Similarly, in the romantic conception of sovereignty, moral and legal
commitments to a particular rule or ruler are aligned: a law that is constitutional is therefore both valid and just, and a man divinely anointed
will surely be just as well as powerful. 76
72 The criticism of Wechsler's "neutral principles" thesis is extensive. For a summary, see
J. Ely, supra note 37, at 54-SS, 212·13 on.58-60.
13 See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
74 J. Bentham, A Commentary on Humphreys' Real Property Code, in 5 Works, supra
note 3, at 389, 389.
7S W. Shakespeare, Richard the Second 76-77 (act 3, scene 2, lines 47-62) (M.W. Black ed.
1959).
16 Dworkin makes the astounding claim in Taking Rights Seriously that every sincere
moral objection to a law in our cwture bas a constitutional analogue. This argument seems
peculiarly nostalgic and dated. R. Dworkin, supra note 3, at 206-19.
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This political explanation, however, is not ultimately satisfying, because the logic of the natural lawyers' claims is easily manipulated. As
Bentham also noted, the identification of law and morality can serve the
end of anarchy as well as the ends of the powerful. 77 Shakespeare's Richard II is finally history, not romance, and in that history, Richard's invocation of romantic imagery eventually works against his sovereignty. If a
Prince's edict evidences a lack of morality, the prince is not a Prince and
his edict not a law. Similarly, a properly passed statute that fails to accord "due process" is a bad law and ought not to be enforced. Natural
law, like other forms of narrative romance, serves the revolutionary as
well as it serves the reactionary.
And yet, the natural law movement in Western culture has yielded
potent, often inspiring, and occasionally profound insights. When natural law is viewed as romantic narrative, this phenomenon is neither paradoxical nor troubling. The natural law traditions in jurisprudence and
romantic narrative share deep human roots. The appeal of both is simply
that we want power to be loving. The divinely anointed King embodies
what not only natural lawyers, but to some extent all of us, still crave: a
powerful sovereign who is moral and just; a powerful figure who loves us.
Like romantic literature, natural law claims are childlike: they express
our deeply felt needs for security, protection, and the perfect love of
those who provide it. The quest of the romantic narrator and the constitutionalist is ultimately for a "nostalgic goal": an "imaginative golden
age in time and space," when power and morality-law and justiceemanate from the same source. 78 The persistence of that quest evidences
the depth of our craving for assurance that the story of the community
will have a happy ending and that we are being cared for, even if the
evidence of our senses-our history-is very much to the contrary.
In reality, we know that we have not even adequately described,
much less attained, a society that fulfills both our childlike needs and the
demands of our more adult intellects. Perhaps our desire to see power
and moral virtue converge will never be satisfied by a particular legal
power. But unless and until that politica1, aesthetic, and primal desire is
satisfied, natural law will continue to be a central force in jurisprudence,
and romantic literature will continue to thrive.

B.

Irony and Realistic Jurisprudence: The Positivist Separation of
Law and Morality
Frye explains that the ironic narrative method, in contrast to the

77 J. Bentham, A Fragment on Government, in I Works, supra note 3, al 221, 287; see
Hart, Positivism, supra note 26, at 597-98.
78 See N. Frye, supra note 4. at 186.
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metaphoric and idealistic method of romance, is characterized by a radically empirical commitment: Do not expect anything or anyone to be
other than he, she, or it appears. 79 The world is as it is experiencednothing less, but certainly nothing more. Abstractions are either ephemeral, and therefore unknowable, or false, and therefore misleading. The
ironic narrator orders his hero's life pragmatically on the basis of experience, not on the basis of either pretended truths underlying that experience or promises regarding the future. 8o Consequently, ironic narrative
is typically dominated by skeptical, often satiric attacks on the purportedly complete characterizations of knowledge proffered by various forms
of romanticism. 81
Like the romantic method, the ironic method merges with comedy
at one extreme and with tragedy at the other. As a result, Frye explains,
the ironic method encompasses a spectrum of realistic narrative visions,
ranging from a gentle, generally benign skepticism to a horrific nihilism.
In the first comic stages of irony the ironic narrator couples a comic,
communitarian vision of society with his methodological insistence on
experiential fact. He consequently cmploys a gentle, benign, satiric
method to expose the shared, conununal reality behind religious, moral,
intellectual, and literary conventions. 82 In the middle stages, social conventions are not just satirized but are stripped away, revealing a shared
but often painful human community.83 Finally, the most tragic stages
reveal the meaninglessness of suffering itself. All moral referents are
completely lost; the world suffers, and there is neither relief from nor
1'J

Id. at 154-55.

to (Irony and satire are] the mythical paUerns of experience, the aUempts to give form to

the shifting ambiguities and complexities ofunidealized existence. We cannot find these
patterns merely in the mimetic or representational aspect of such literature, for that
aspect is one of content and not form. As structure, the central principle of ironic myth
is best approached as a parody of romance: the application of romantic mythical forms
to a more realistic content which fits them in unexpected ways. No one in a romance,
Don Quixote protests, ever asks who pays for the hero·s accommodation.
Id. at 223.
81 Satire has an interest in anything men do. The philosopher, on the other hand, teaches a
certain way or method of living; he stresses some things and despises others; what be
recommends is carefully selected from the data of human life; he continually passes
moral judgments on social behavior. His attitude is dogmatic; that of the satirist pragmatic. Hence satire may often represent the collision between a selection of standards
from experience and the feeling that experience is bigger than any set of beliefs about it.
The satirist demonstrates the infinite variety of what men do by showing the futility, not
only of saying wbat they ought to do, but even of attempts to systematize or fonnulate a
coherent scheme of what they do. Philosophies of life abstract from life, and an abstraction implies the leaving out of inconvenient data. The satirist brings up those inconvenient data .
Id. at 229.
82 Id.
8) Id. at 232·36.
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sense in that ultimate experience. 84
The visionary range of the ironic mode can be viewed as:
COMEDY

(Satirization of romantic
delusions)
(Denunciation of romantic
charade)

IRONY

ROMANCE

(The Method of Experience)

(Resignation to nihilism; the
moral and aesthetic emptiness
behind the romance)

TRAGEDY

Like the ironic storyteller, the legal positivist employs a radically
empirical method that is saturated with experiential fact. The positivist's story of law's sovereignty is rigorously experiential: Law is the consequence of legislation and adjudication, both being real events caused by
physical forces. 8S Human beings. not disembodied "neutral principles,"
decide cases and enact statutes. Similarly, the practical person
experiences jail sentences and damage remedies. not "general rules of
1M Id. at 236-39.
II!l Sec, e.g., J. Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law (1909); Bingham, What Is the
Law? (pts. I & 2), 11 Mich. L. Rev. I, 109 (1912); Holmes, supra note 3, at 459 ("If you want
to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man who cares only for thl!
material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict . . . . "); Hutcheson,
Lawyer's Law and the Little, Small Dice, 7 Tulane L. Rev. I (1932).
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law," as the essence of law. To the legal pragmatist, whether narrator,
theorist, or actor, generalities have no function, no historical impact, no
experiential presence and therefore no meaningful existence. Law is the
story of history and experience. In Holmes's famous formulation, law is
experience, not logic; it is the "story of a nation's development."s6
What the natural lawyer purports to discover as "truth" or as "law"
are not, then, aspects of the real world, but merely the products of his
own introspection. In Justice Holmes's colorful phrase, what we believe
as true and eternal is that collection of propositions which we "cannot
help" but believe. 87 Just as the ironic narrator exposes the counterfactual
myths underlying romance, the positivist exposes the romantic delusions
underlying the natural lawyer's convictions. Holmes's attack on the certitudes of the natural law tradition is a classic instance of the ironist's
satirization of the abstractions of romanticism:
It is not enough for the knight of romance that you agree that his
lady is a very nice girl-if you do not admit that she is the best that
God ever made or will make, you must fight. There is in all men a
demand for the superlative, so much so that the poor devil who has no
other way of reaching it attains it by getting drunk. It seems to me
that this demand is at the bottom of the philosopher's effort to prove
that truth is absolute and of the jurist's search for criteria of universal
validity which he coUects under the head of natural law.
The jurists who believe in natural law seem to me to be in that
naive state of mind that accepts what has been familiar and accepted
by them and their neighbors as something that must be accepted by all
men everywhere. 88

More recently, Professor Unger has mocked the modem variant of the
romantic's insistent need to identify power as the prerequisite of justice-or in Unger's phrase, "power and perception as right":
The legal academy. . . dallied in one more variant of the perennial effort to restate power and perception as right. In and outside the
86 The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessilies of the
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their feUow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should
be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a
book of mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must know what it has been, and
what it tends to become. . . . The substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly
corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then understood to be convenient; but its
form and machinery, and the degree to which it is able to work out desired results,
depend very much upon its past.
D.W. Holmes, supra note 3, at 1-2.
87 Holmes, Ideals and Doubts, 10 Ill. L Rev. 1,2(1915).
88 Holmes, Natural Law, 32 Harv. L Rev. 40, 40-41 (1918).
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law schools, most jurists looked with indifference and even disdain
upon the legal theorists who. like the rights and principles or the law
and economics schools, had volunteered to salvage and recreate the
traditions of objectivism and formalism. These same unanxious skep.
tics. however, also rejected any alternative to the formalist and objec.
tivist view. Having failed to persuade themselves of all but the most
equivocal versions of the inherited creed. they nevertheless clung to its
implications and brazenly advertised their own failure as the triumph
of worldly wisdom over intellectual and political enthusiasm. History
they degraded into the retrospective rationalization of events. Philoso·
phy they abased into an inexhaustible compendium of excuses for the
truncation of legal analysis. The social sciences they perverted into the
source of argumentative ploys with which to give arbitrary though
stylized policy discussions the blessing of a specious authority.89

Just as natural law embraces the substantive range of romantic nar M
rative, so legal positivism, the jurisprudential method of experience, COVM
ers the substantive range of ironic narrative. Depending upon the
substantive vision with which it is coupled, the positivist method ranges
from gentle satirization of the natural lawyer's theories, through angry
denunciation of their deceptions, and finally to resigned acceptance of the
finality of perceived "reality" and rejection of imaginative and spiritual
alternatives. Most of the legal realist writings from the first part of this
century, as well as the various contemporary fonns of legal thinking that
are their legacy, combine the ironist's insistence on fact and experience
with a comic vision of the communitarian basis of law.90 That combinaM
tion is central to comic irony. Most of the critical legal studies move M
ment also combines an experiential or historical method with a
communitarian vision of the possible. It differs from legal realism, however, in that it sees horror in the present and comic romanticism as not
just delusion but outright deception. 91 Such a combination characterizes
Frte's midMlevel irony: ultimately comic, but very much aware of its
proximity to the demonic. 92 Finally, the law and economics movement
has inherited from Hobbes an experientialism coupled with a denial of
the relevance, and perhaps even the existence, of morally superior imaginative worlds. 93 These are the working assumptions of the tragic ironist.
The range of visions our jurisprudential method of experience covers
thus correlates tightly with the range of vision embraced by ironic
narrative:
89 Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 561,674-75 (1983).
90 See, e.g., M. Cohen & F. Cohen, Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy 369526 (1951) (including an excellent coUection of realist writings).
91 See, e.g., Unger. supra note 89, at 575.
92 See N. Frye, supra note 4, at 236-37.
93 See, e.g., A. Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics (1983).
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LIBERALISM
(Comedy)
(Satirization through use of
experience of natural law
claims; Bentham vs.
Blackstone; the legal
realists vs. the formalists)
(Denunciation through use of
experience; critical legal
studies)

NATURAL LAW

i - - - - - L EGAL POSITIVISM
(Irony)

(Resignation through use of
experience; Hobbes and the
modem economists)

STATISM
(Tragedy)

1.

Comic Irony: Reform and Satire

Just as the bulk of our romantic jurisprudence is comic in outlook,
so the vast bulk of our ironic jurisprudence, from the reform-minded
Benthamites94 through the American realists 95 to much of the critical
legal studies movement,96 falls within Frye's comic stages of satire. Such
positivist jurisprudence, like first-stage narrative irony, uses experience to
rebut gently the romantic's claim that law is a function of principled
generality,91 rules themselves,98 higher moral trutbs,99 or the Rule of
~4 See. e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory (1982).
95 See, e.g., R. Summers, Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory (1982).
96 See, e.g., Unger. supra note 89.
97 See 1. Ely, supra note 37, at 54-60.
98 See Llewellyn, Some Realism About ReaJism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 Harv. L.
Rev. 1222 ( 1931).
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Law. too These romantic mythologies mask the experiential fact that law
is a function of the wishes, ends, will, or pathology of whoever is in
power. The natural lawyer's romantic belief that through law we somehow negate the power basis upon which legal systems are built is an iHusian. To expose the myths of formalism, the legal positivist, like the
ironic narrator, is interested in "anything men dO,"IOI including that
which the romantic natural lawyer would ignore. Bentham's attack on
Blackstone's "common law,"i02 the attacks of LJewellyn, Frank, and
Pound on "mechanical jurisprudence,"i03 as well as Professor Hart's attack on the romantic constitutionalism of Fuller and Dworkin,I04 all fit
easily and obviously within this comic stage of irony. All employ factsmost often anecdotal descriptions of the judicial experience-to satirize
and debunk the claimed generality and abstraction of law. Every first
year law school curriculum reflects the continuing dominance of comic
irony in our legal culture; benign satire of entrenched authority is what
the legal profession knows and teaches best.
In its comic phases, the experiential method and the debunking of
idealism are coupled with a liberal, optimistic vision of society and of
progress. As a consequence, jurisprudential comic irony is typically the
province of the social democrat, at least in this country. The comic
ironist wants the source of authority unveiled so that its communitarian
basis may be clarified. In the first half of this century, the heyday of
comic irony, this ground was occupied by the legal realists. As ironists,
the realists criticized entrenched authority, advocating instead an active,
highly visible judiciary that would freely discover and then pursue the
true social interest. Thus, Holmes saw "public policy" behind the obfus
cating rules of the common law; lOS Cardozo looked to the " method of
sociology" to account for judicial behavior; 106 and Lasswell and McDou
gal looked to the new social sciences to provide the tools by which law
w

w

w

100 See generally the works of Mark Tushnet, particularly Truth, Justice and the American
Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies. 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1307
(1979).
101 See note 81 supra.
[02 J. Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government V.H.
Burns & H .L.A. Hart ed. 1977). See generally RL.A. Hart, The Demyslification of the Law,
in Essays on Bentham, supra note 94, at 21.
103 K. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (1930); Frank, Mr. Justice Holmes and Non·Euciidian
Legal Thinking, \7 Come11 L. Q. 568 (1932); Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Colum. L.
Rev. 60S (1908). See generally R. Summers, supra note 95, at 136·56.
[04 See H.L.A. Hart, supra note 35, at 49·87, 12344, 198-222 (1983).
lOS D.W. Holmes, supra note 3, at 35-36, 94-96.
106 B. Cardoza, The Nature of the Judicial Process 98-141 (1921).
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and the lawyering professions could strengthen the communitarian
bond. 107 Holmes described the judicial role and the social context that
an ironic method and comic vision imply:
[I]n substance the growth of the law is legislative. And this in a
deeper sense than that what the courts declare to have always been the
law is in fact new. It is legislative in its grounds. The very considerations which judges most rarely mention, and always with an apology,
are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices of life. I
mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned. Every important principle which is developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of more or less definitely
understood views of public policy; most generally, to be sure, under
our practice and traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions, but none the less traceable to views
of public policy in the last analysis. And as the law is administered by
able and experienced men. who know too much to sacrifice good sense to
a syllogism, it will be found that, when ancient rules maintain them-

selves in the way that has been and will be shown in this book, new
reasons more fitted to the time have been found for them, and that they
gradually receive a new content, and at last a new form, from the
grounds to which they have been transplanted. lOS
Thus, the legal realists were consistently both comic and ironic. Their
realism led them to uncover the historical, actual grounding of law in the
fact of judicial power-a potentially startling and disturbing insight. But
their comic optimism reassured them that such power was not to be
feared. In Holmes's words again, judges are «able and experienced men"
who can be trusted to shape the direction of American social policy.
Today it is a critic of an active judiciary, Dean John Ely. who is our
ultimate first-stage satirist and thus our most eloquent democrat. 109 This
new development is in a sense a direct consequence of the success of the
realist movement: the "public policy" basis of judicial opinions has indeed been laid bare. With the apparatus of formalism stripped away,
judicial opinions now overtly rest on the moral authority of their authors. Just as the realists distrusted and debunked. the moral authority of
the academic and often invisible authors of "formalism," preferring the
conscious and immediate moral guidance of the courts, so Ely distrusts
and debunks tbejudiciary's claim to moral authority, preferring the even
more immediate moral guidance gleaned. from participatory democ101 Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy; Professional Training in the
Public Interest. 52 Yale L.J. 203 (1943).
108 D.W. Holmes. supra note 3, at 35·36 (emphasis added).
109 &e, e.g., J. Ely, supra note 37, at 54-60 (satirizing constitutional theories based on neu·
tral principles or reason).
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racy.IIO Thus, in practice, Ely and the realists are doing precisely the
same tbing, although their conclusions differ. It therefore is hardly surprising that Ely, like the realists he attacks, uses ironic, anecdotal narrative to make his point.
Ely's use of narrative is as skillful as Holmes's. Ely quotes the ironic
narrator Philip Roth to refute the romantic natural lawyer's case for judicial supremacy:
"Well, what may seem like the truth to you," said the seventeenyear-old bus driver and part-time philosopher, "may not, of course,
seem like tbe truth to the other fella, you know."
"THEN THE OTHER FELLOW IS WRONG, IDIOT!" I I.

and the ironic historian Garry Wills to refute the romantic historian's:
Running men out of town on a rail is at least as much an American tradition as declaring unalienable rights. 1I2

But Ely does not stop with his realistic attack on the natural lawyer.
He invokes the same arguments and the same narrative method against
the oddly romantic myths that the realists themselves had created. Thus,
against the realists' inference of "ought" from "is," Ely employs his most
ironic narrative tone, and teUs this story:
[t]he explanation [for why one might think a judge ought to enforce her own values in adjudication] seems to involve what might be
called the fallacy of transformed realism. About forty years ago people
"discovered" that judges were human and therefore were likely in a
variety of legal contexts consciously or unconsciously to slip their personal values into their legal reasonings. From that earth-shattering insight it has seemed to some an easy inference that that is what judges
ought to be doing. Two observations are in order, both obvious. The
first is that sueh a "realist" theory of adjudication is not a theory of
adjudication at all, in that it does not tell us which values should be
imposed. The second is that the theory's "inference" does not even
remotely follow: that people have always been tempted to steal does
not mean that stealing is what they should be doing. This is all plain
as a pikestaff, which means something else has to be going on. People
who tend to this extreme realist view must consciously or unconsciously be envisioning a Court staffed by justices who think as they
do. That assumption takes care of both the problems I've mentioned.
It tells you what values are to be imposed (the commentator's own)
and also explains (at least to the satisfaction of the commentator) why
such a Court would be desirable. But it's a heroic assumption, and the
argument that seems to score most heavily against such a "realist" outno ld. at 87-104.
Id. at 48 (quoting P. Roth, The Great American Novel 19 (1973».
Id. at 60 (quoting G. Wills, Inventing America: l elferson's Declaration of Independence
xiii (1978».
til

til
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look is one that is genuinely realistic-that there is absolutely no assurance that the Supreme Court's life-tenured members (or the other
federal judges) will be persons who share your values. III

Viewed as a narrator, however, Ely is clearly aligned with the realists be attacks. Like them, he uses his stories to "[break] up the lumber
of stereotypes, fossilized beliefs, superstitious terrors, crank theories, pedantic dogmatisms, oppressive fashions, and all other things that impede
the free movement of ... society."114 Ely does to the moral authority of
the active judiciary and the myths that surround it precisely what Bentham and the legal realists did to the moral authority of the "common
law"ll!S and what historian Garry Wills later did to the moral authority
of the Kennedy-era "Camelot." 116
2.

Black Comic Irony: Denunciation and Radicalism

With a slight shift of perspective from reliance on faith and reason
to reliance on tangible sensual reality, Frye explains, "the solid earth [of
realism] becomes an intolerable horror."117 This shift of perspective
characterizes mid-level ironic narrative. With such a shift, the penetrating insights of legal realism become, to use Dean Pound's phrase. the
"cult of the ugly.n ll8 The persistent gaze of the realist eventually perceives not the fruits of the labor of wise and able men, but the fist of
power behind a virtually unchecked jUdiciary. Dean Pound dramatizes
the point through narrative and imagery in the following anecdote:
I suggest to you that so-called realism in jurisprudence is related
to realism in art rather than to philosophical realism. Like realism in
art it is a cult of the ugly. . .. An artist commissioned to paint the
portrait of one of the outstanding judges of the recent past noted that
he had a huge fist and a habit of holding it out before him. Accordingly, as a realist, he painted the fist elaborately in the foreground as
the chief feature of the portrait, behind which, if one's gaze can get by
the fist, one may discover in the background a thoughtful countenance.
The judge did have such a fist and did hold it out in front of him on
occasion. But having known him well for years, I doubt if anyone
thought about it until the artist seized upon it and made it the main
feature of his portrait. The fist existed. But was it the significant feature of the judge? Was reality in the sense of significance in the fist or
in the countenance?1I9
III Id. at 44 (emphasis in original).

114 See N. Frye, supra note 4, at 233.
lIS
116
111
118
119

See nOle 102 supra.
See G. Wills, The Kennedy Imprisonment (1981).
N. Frye, supra note 4, at 235.
R. Pound, Juslice According to Law 90 (1959).
Id. at 90-91.
HeinOnline -- 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 177 1985

Imaged with the Penni ~sion of N.Y.U. Law Review

178

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:145

Holmes's ideal judge, then, may be perceived and portrayed not as a
tool of reason with a thoughtful countenance, but as a fist wielding the
power of the legal sanction he controls. The realist judges are, in Professor Cover's telling phrase, "people of violence."12o With the same shift
of perspective, however, Ely's empowered, participatory democracy is
similarly transformed, not into a fist, but-perhaps worse-into a "bodily democracy paralleling the democracy of death in the danse macabre. "121 Like modem literary irony, modem positivism tends not to be
gentle.
Modern positivists share the realists' insistence on experientialism,
but their substantive visions differ markedly. The liberal realist views the
discovery of judicial power with a sense of liberation, whereas the critical
legal scholar sees no such cause for enthusiasm. Ely views the empower·
ment of the governed with the democrat's faith in humanity,lll but the
critical legal scholar insists upon the potential for majoritarian oppression such empowerment entails}23 The realists saw concentrated power
as an opportunity for reasoned reform and ultimately for progress, but
the critical scholar sees only cause for alarm. The contrast between their
criticism of formalism and natural law is equally telling: where the real·
ist saw folly in the romantic delusions of tbe natural lawyer, the critical
scholar sees a demonic deception in the artificiality of formalism. These
differences stem not from contrasting metbods, but from divergent visions. Like the realist, the critical scholar harbors a passionate vision of
an apocalyptic, communitarian potential. But the critical scholar has
for the most part abandoned the realists' liberal, optimistic assessment of
our history and their faith in our capacity for rational progress toward
the future. 124 The central narrative task of the critical legal studies
movement, then, is to tell a story that will explain this profound contra·
diction. On the one hand, we have within our nature and presumably
within our grasp the potential for a communitarian utopia, and yet on
the other, what we have inherited-what we have in fact created-can
only be described as "intolerable horror."
As is characteristic of the ironic mode, tbe critical legal scholar uses
the analogy of experience to tell his story. To the critical scholar, a true
understanding of the history of romantic jurisprudence illuminates the
dilemma. The history of romanticism and faith in natural law is a history of deceit: the atomistic, alienated, bureaucratic hell in which we live
120 Cover, The Supreme Court. 1982 Tenn-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L.
Rev. I, 53 (1983).

121 The phrase is Frye's. N. Frye, supra Dote 4, at 235.
122 1. Ely, supra note 37, at 181·83.
IlJ See, e.g., R. Unger, Law in Modem Society 69 (1976).
124 See id. at 238-39.
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is not, after all, the best social world of which we are capable. 125 Both
conservative and liberal romanticism further this massive deception. Romantic descriptions of our social world mask a horrific reality just as
legal doctrine masks the oppressive political reality of law. 126 The romantic either misperceives or misrepresents as apocalyptic that which in
fact is demonic: he misrepresents as consensus that which is in fact domination,I27 and he misrepresents as inevitable a world that is in fact the
product of contingent choices. 128 The hypocrisies of which Holmes, Ely,
and others make light are not simply theoretical musings; they are the
devil's disguise. In mid-level positivism, as in mid-level irony, awareness
of the demonic is never far away. Consequently, denunciation replaces
satire and trashing replaces mockery.129
The major difference between the critical legal scholar's debunking
of formalism and the realist's satirization of generality is not method,
which they share, but vision, which leads the critical scholars to a very
different agenda for social action. The critical scholar sees a far wider
divergence than does the realist between our communitarian potential
and our inherited hell. lID The critical scholar responds to this gulf in one
of two ways. Mark Tushnet-like Huck Finn-makes his detachment
from the contemporary legal community clear with the bald assertion
that if he were a judge, he would, at least in theory, decide cases so as to
promote socialism. 131 Roberto Unger takes a more aggressive stance: If
the formalist's romantic agenda is not just delusion, but mean-spirited
deception, then we must aggressively attack and then transform the institutions that the perverse choices of the powerful have created. We cannot gradually "peel away" the pretense offormalism. We cannot "slowly
evolve" from something rotten at the core into something beautifu1.
Only radical change can alter that which has gone radically sour.1l2
113 Unger, supra note 89, at 674.
126 Id. at 609-11.
121 Id. at 593-97.
121 Id. at 674-75.
129 See, e.g., Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 Yale L.J. 1229
(1981).
130 See, e.g., R. Unger, supra note 123; Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976); Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism,
42 Ohio St. L.l, 411 (1981).
131 Tushnet, supra note 130, at 424. Tushnet notes, however, that if he were to become a
judge, the role itself would probably change him and cause him to decide cases in a way
contrary to that which his theories would compel. rd. at 425.
132 [TJhe struggle over the form of soci31life, through deviationist doctrine, creates oppor·
tunities for eJlpc:rimentai revisions of social life in the direction of the ideals we defend.
An implication of our ideas is that the elements of a formative institutional or imaginative structure may be replaced piecemeal rather than only all at once. Between conserving reform and revolution •.. lies the expedient of revolutionary reform, defined as th e
substitution of one or the constituent elements of a fonnative context. Only an actual
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The critical legal scholar is in some ways the pure itonist, believing
that the hell we have inherited is not the utopia of which we are capable.
Though knowledge of history will inform our understanding of the former, only the will to undertake radical action and the courage to tran-

scend and transform historically grounded norms will further our
progress toward the latter.

3.

Tragic Realism: Resignation as Method and Vision

In the final and illiberal phases of legal positivism, as in the final
tragic phases of ironic narrative, the theorist posits a social world that
precludes both the possibility and the intelligibility of either reformist or
radical change. In tragic irony. experience instructs our normative alternatives, as in comedic irony. but what this experience teaches is that
there is no shared human nature upon which to build a communitarian
world. The English reformers, the legal realists, and the critical legal
scholars are all simply wrong. We do not have an essentially social, communitarian nature, nor do we have a deeply hidden utopian potential; we
truly are nasty and brutish.133 We have no greater inclination for a libera1, free world in which we enjoy both the differences and the commonalities of others than we have for our own self-destruction. Our present
world is vicious, our future will be the same, and both are the result of an
unchanging and unchangeable human nature.
Such an aesthetic sensibility is overtly espoused by very few modem
theorists,t34 but the covert influence of moral nihilism in the legal academy is pervasive, in both law school classrooms and law reviews. m This
nihilism is the implicit philosophical justification for the amorality of the
law school classroom on both sides of the podium, and of the courtroom
on both sides of the bench. It justifies the amorality of the profession and
change in the recurrent fOIlD$ of the routine activities-of production and exchange or
of the conflict over the uses and mastery of governmental power-can show whether a
replacement of some component of the formative context has in fact taken pIau. By
atrecting the application of state power, a programmatically inspired deviationist doc·
trine may provide opportunitics for coUective mobilization that in turn can lead directly
or indirecdy to revolutionary reform.
Unger, supra note 89, at 666-67.
133 See T. Hobbes, Leviathan 104-09 (Libentl Arts ed. 1958) (1st ed. London 16!H).
134 Hobbes of course comcs closest, and it is interesting how Hobbes. the archmonarchist
and acchstatist of his day, is increasingly invoked as the intellectual forefather of liberalism.
See Tushnet, Legal Realism, Structural Review, and Prophecy, 8 U. Daylon L. Rev. 809. 809·
11 (1983); Tushnet, Legal Scholarship; Its Causes and Cure, 90 Yale L.J. 1205, 1206 (1981).
Some works of Bark also approach this sensibility. See, e.g., R. Bark., H. Krane &. G.
Webster, Political Activities of Colleges and Univenities: Some Policy and Legal Implications
1-8 ( 1970); Bark, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. LJ. 1
(1971).
US Professor David Richards takes up this issue in his article Terror and the Law, 5 Hum.
Rts. Q. 171, 183-85 (1983); see also note 207 infra.
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of the Code of Professional Responsibility.136 It provides some intellectual credibility for the claim of the legal profession and the legal academy
that the lawyer in her professional role can responsibly refuse to take a
stand on moral issues. 137
Perhaps more fundamentally, the modem prevalence of a positivistic moral nihilism provides a rationale for today's fashionable commitment to individualism. This position differs markedly from, although it
is often confused with, liberal narrative. As discussed in the next section,
both nineteenth-century English liberals and early twentieth-century
American radicals embraced individualism because of their optimistic,
comic assumption that human nature is constituted such that state authority is unnecessary.138 Today, by contrast, our "individualistic" distrust of authority is more often premised upon the tragic assumption that
human nature is constituted such that moral authority is impossible.1 39
The former assumption presupposes a communitarian human personality, whereas the latter presupposes an asocial, demonic world, The latter
Hobbesian argument for individualism is grounded not in a love for and
a liberal tolerance of the individual but in a demonic assessment of
human nature, and a resignation to an alienated asocial coexistence. l40
Through a gross bastardization of the term, this decidedly illiberal stance
is today called "liberalism" by its proponents and its critics alike.
This ambiguity may account for the peculiarly schizoid aesthetic
posture of members of the law and economics school. 141 To the extent
that their normative vision is derived from individualistic liberalism, it is
romantic and comic: individual choice, like divine anointment, both defines and legitimates law. 142 Their descriptive vision, however, is at the
same time tragic-ironic: the individual whose choice is sovereign is isolated, ruled by arbitrary desire, and essentially selfish; this experiential
fact defines one's normative altematives. 143 Consequently, and confusedly, the tragic, dire convictions of the Hobbesian "law and economics"
136 See. e.g., ModeJ Code of ProfessionaJ Responsibility Canon 7 (1979) ("A lawyer should
represent a client zealously within the boWlds of the law.").
Il7 See genera1ly M. Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System (1975). But see
Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Mora1 Issues, 5 Hum. Rts. I (1975).
US This idea may be traced to Adam Smith's identification of sympathy as the natural
human sentiment holding community together. I A. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments
1-22 (6th ed. London 1790) (1st ed. London 1759).
139 The historical lineage of this assumption dates to Hobbes: hence the increasingly popular appellation of Hobbes as a father of modem liberalism. See note 134 supra.
140 See, e.g., R. Posner, The Economics of Justice 1-115 (1981).
toll See, e.g., id.j A. Polinsky, supra note 93.
I.Z See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 140; A. Polinsky, supra note 93; Posner, The Ethical and
Political Basis of the Efficiency Nonn in Common Law Adjudication, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 487,
488·502 (1980).
loll See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 140; A. Polinsky, supra note 93.
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theorist are espoused with the optimism of the comic and the confidence
of the romantic. l44 That may, of course, be precisely because they have
reached what Frye calls "the ironic aspect of tragedy,"14S The purportedly impenetrable subjectivity of our values, 146 like the last stages of titerary irony. erases all aesthetic distinctions between the beautiful and the
ugly, the sublime and the ridiculous, the comic and the tragic. We are
what we are, and relief is not even necessary. much less imaginable or in
sight. Human alienation is a fact of nature. In its last phase, legal positivism, as in the last phase of tragic irony generally. depicts human suffering as of absolutely no normative consequence.

4.

The Appeal of Irony

The appeal of legal positivism as a method of jurisprudence is not
difficult to explain. As Bentham first noted,!"" and as Holmes. 148 the
realists, '49 and most recently the critical legal scholars ISO have reiterated,
a realistic insistence on the separation of what is from what ought to be is
essential to meaningful progress toward fulfilling our dreams. We must
resist the impulse to romanticize the present-to fuse what is with what
ought to be-if we intend to transcend or improve our given world. The
positivist separation of law and morality-ofwhat is from what ought to
be and what could be-is indeed a prerequisite of legal reform, whether
that reform be radical, liberal. individualist. or communitarian.
Yet positivism must come to grips with its central ambiguities. We
might insist upon the separation of law and morality-of what "is" from
what "ought to be"-because we want to understand our history better.
demythologize it, and then work more directly toward normative goals.
Alternatively, we might insist that law and morality be separate because
of our conviction, or fear, that "morality" does not meaningfully exist,
because moral norms are not as "real" as sanction-backed legal norms.
Aesthetically, this can be described as the difference between tragic and
comic irony. Jurisprudentially, it is the difference between a scientific
approach to the law coupled with a vision of moral possibility, and a
1044 See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 140, at 362·63 (cheerful account of the benign nature of
most race discrimination); A. Polinsky, supra nOle 93, at viii (joking, comic description of the
antihislorical starting premises of economic theory).
[45 N. Frye, supra note 4, at 236.
146 See Dork, supra note 134, at 28-29.
141 1. Bentham, supra note 102, at 37-58. See generally H.L.A. Hart, supra note 102, at 19,
21-28.
t•• O.W. Holmes, supra note 3, at 168·76.
t.9 See, e.g., F. Cohen, Ethical Syslems and Legal Ideals: An Essay on the Foundalions of
Legal Criticism 14·1 5 (1933); 1. Gray, The Nature and Sources of Law 94 (2d ed. 1921);
Uewellyn, supra note 98, al 1236-38. See generally R. Summers, supra nole 95, al 176-90.
ISO See R. Unger, supra note 123, al 48·~8.
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scientific approach to the law coupled with a nihilistic denial of the possi~
bility of such a vision. Politically and humanistica1ly, it is the difference
between a historical sophistication that can provide the basis for progress
toward our dreams, and a historica1 insistence that keeps our attention
narrowly and exclusively focused on, and limited to, what has been tried,
tested, and chosen.
Positivism in its comic phases provides the satire necessary to un~
derstand the delusions, the deceptions, and the apologetic core of formal~
ism, as well as the knowledge of the world necessary for responsible
striving toward alternative worlds. In its tragic phases, however, irony
expresses itself not in healthy satire or unmasking of illusion, but in a
dangerous and limiting cynicism; not an enthusiastic embrace of our pos~
sibilities, but a resigned insistence on the exclusivity of what has already
been determined.
In both narrative and jurisprudence, then, tragic irony represents
the death of imagination, and its ascendency in so many fields of thought
is a frightening phenomenon}51 Professor MacIntyre notes that it is not
surprising, for example, that the dark ironist Franz Kafka failed to finish
so much of his work: tragic irony, although a form of narrative, is in
many ways antinarrative; it denies the possibility of a coherent future, so
central to storytelling, and thus cannot be finished. 152 The law and eco~
nomics school is similarly antinarrative (as well as antihistorical) and is
dangerous in the same way. By insisting upon the exclusivity of the in~
stantaneous present, tragic irony deprives us of the precious opportunity
to make moral stories of our own lives.
The allure and the danger of a mindless romanticism, however, are
equally strong, and it is as a check against such a danger that positivism
has the most to contribute. We need the check of experience against
imagination. As storytellers, we combine these two capacities almost in ~
stinctively. We imagine a possible ending to our story and check its com~
pliance with what we know. Extant law gives us the beginning
paragraphs of narrative. The central moral of the positivist separation of
law and morality may be that, to finish the story, we must first envision
moral altematives-employing imagination, knowledge, and moral dis~
course-before we can possibly pursue them.
151 Alasdair MacIntyre discusses the reasons ror this development in intellectual history in
A. Macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 46-113 (1981).
152 Id. at 198.

HeinOnline -- 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 183 1985

Imaged with the

Pcnni ~siol1

or N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY UW REVIEW

184

(Vol. 60:145

IV
NARRATIVE MYfHS AND JURISPRUDENTIAL VISIONS

A.

Comedy and Liberalism: From Ritualistic Bondage
to Pragmatic Freedom
Frye calls narrative comedy the "mythos of spring."I S3 While trag
edy envisions an inevitable conflict between the individual and the community. comedy posits the natural compatibility of men and women with
each other and with their societies. IS4 If human beings are naturally social. then communities, whether they be marriages, families, parties, or
states, will promote their members' happiness. Particular societies may
fail-some historical communities have undeniably crippled instead of
enriched the human spirit-but such failures are exceptional and temporary. Comedy speaks to our awareness of the potential for happiness
inherent in our communitarian associations. The faith of comedy, in direct contrast to that of tragedy, is that the natural inclination of people is
toward happiness and sociability, and that the natural movement of social history is toward an expansion and not a diminution of our capacity
for joy. ISS
Literary comedy follows well-established story lines. Comic plots
move their characters from old and arid social orders in which form,
artifice, and chicanery conspire to suppress the healthy urges of youthful
heroes, to young, fresh, and social worlds, in which the freed heroes live
relatively happy and naturally hannonious lives. I '6 At the outset of
comic action, the hero is almost invariably alone, unhappy, and "imprisoned" in some sort of outmoded, foolish, or evil bondage. By the end he
or she is engulfed in a happy and freer society. m
Frye describes the arbitrary, formalistic, legalistic, and stagnant
world from which the comic hero breaks free in this way:
M

The humor in comedy is usually someone with a great deal of socia1
prestige and power, who is able to force much of the play's society into
line with his obsession. Thus the humor is intimately connected with
the theme of the absurd or irrational law that the action of comedy
moves toward breaking. . . . Often the absurd law appears as a whim
of a bemused tyrant whose will is law . . . who makes some arbitrary
decision or rash promise. . . . Or it may take the fonn of a sham
Utopia, a society of ritua1 bondage constructed by an act of humorous
or pedantic will.. . . ISS
153 N. Frye, supra note 4, at 163.
154 Id.
mId. at 164-66.
IS6 Id . at 163·64.
mId. at 164.
mId. at 169.
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The social world toward which the dramatic action of comedy moves is
described in this way:
Comedy usuaUy moves toward a happy ending, and the normal response of the audience to a happy ending is "this should be," which
sounds like a moral judgment. So it is, except that it is not moral in
the restricted sense, but social. . . . The society emerging at the conclusion of comedy represents. . . a kind of moral norm, or pragmatically free society. Its ideals are se~dom defined or fonnulated:
definition and formulation belong to the humors, who want predictable
activity. We are simply given to understand that the newly-married
couple will live happily ever after, or that at any rate they will get
along in a relatively unhumorous and clear-sighted manner.1S9

Frye explains that comedy "blends into irony and satire at one end
and into romance at the other."I60 At one extreme, comedy's optimistic
vision is conveyed by a narrative method which is ahistorical, "innocent," and metaphorical. At the other, its method depends upon experience and fact. The romantic phases of comedy are characterized by a
vision of an ideal, rural, "green," and innocent world that occasionally
collides with, but generally triumphs over, the real world of experience.
As literary comedy moves away from romance and toward irony, its
method becomes increasingly experiential and its optimism more tentative. Frye describes the ironic comic's acceptance of society, in contrast
to the romantic's, as fragile, quixotic, and contingent. 161
A passage from The Tempest encapsulates these two methodological
extremes of the comedy's optimistic vision. By the end of the play, both
Miranda and Prospero embrace the "real" world of human society and
reject their illusory and isolated island existence. The methods by which
they reach their communitarian commitments, however, contrast
sharply. Miranda, raised on an island in relative isolation, innocently
We notice how orten the action of a Shakespearean comedy begins witb some absurd,
cruel, or irrational law: the law of killing Syracusans in tbe Ccmedy of Errors, tbe Jaw of
compulsory marriage in A Midsummer Night's Dream, tbe law that confinns Shylock's
bond, the attempts of Angelo to legislate people into rigbteousness. and the like, which
the action of the comedy then evades or breaks.
Id. at 166.
Thus the movement . . . from a society controlled by babit, ritual bondage, arbitrary
law and the older characters to a society controlled by youth and pragmatic freedom is
fundamentally . . . a movement from illusion to reality. Illusion is whatever is fixed or
definable, and reality is best understood as its negation: whatever rea1ity is, it's not that.
Hence the importance of tbe theme of creating and dispeffing illusion in comedy: the
illusions caused by disguise, obsession, hypocrisy, or unknown parentage.
Id. at 169·70.
159 Id. at 167-69.
160 Id. at 177.
16t Id. at 177-80.
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and unqualifiedly embraces her newly discovered community of
cocitizens:
Miranda: 0 wonder!
How many goodly creatures are there here!
How beauteous mankind is!
o brave new world,
That has such people in't!
Prospera: T'is new to thee. 162
Prospera's more sober preference for a concrete and real society over the
isolation and illusion of island living follows a lifetime of experience with
both worlds. Prospera's longing for real community is not nearly as exu-

berant or unqualified as Miranda's wide-eyed anticipation, but his appreciation for society is far better informed:
Prospera: Now my charms are all o'erthrown,
And what strength 1 have's mine own,
Which is most faint: now, t'is true,
I must be here confined by you,
Or sent to Naples. Let me not,
Since I have my dukedom got,
And pardoned the deceiver, dwell
In this bare island, by your spell.
But release me from my bands
With the help of your good hands. 163

Comedy's methodological range can be schematized in this way:
COMEDY
(Apocalyptic. Communitarian Vision)

Optimism based on the Analogy
of Innocence (faith and reason)

Optimism based on the Analogy
of Experience (skepticism and
community)

ROMANTIC MODE.-----.L.------IRONIC MODE

The political traditions loosely called "liberalism" share comedy's
optimistic assessment that democratic societies progress through history
from a stage of "ritual bondage" to a state of "pragmatic freedom."I64
162 W. Shakespeare, The Tempest 102 (lict V, lines 182·86) (N. Frye cd. 1970).
161 Jd. at 108 (epilogue, lines 1.10).
164 See text accompanying notes 174-86 infra.
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At the heart of liberalism is the apocalyptic claim that it is an intrinsic
part of our human nature to seek, profit from, and further the welfare of
others.16s Moral government is therefore the norm, the end toward
which history naturally moves, whereas antagonistic government is the
world of bondage from which we break free. Community is our natural
state; it is not a compact into which we enter to avoid the horrific conditions of the state of nature. Communities nurture and enhance the natural inclination and therefore the happiness of their individual
members. 166 Political liberalism, like literary comedy, assumes a world
in which human nature is naturally good, so that morality need be
neither prescribed nor posited. We simply are such that moral conduct is
natural. In both the world of literary comedy and that of politicalliberalism, pragmatic freedom is made possible by the natural coincidence of
the moral good, the community's good, and the individual's interest.
The apocalyptic comic myth also finds expression in liberal jurisprudence. Like political liberalism, liberal legal theory rests on a comic view
of history and human nature: progress is an inherent good, unnecessarily
retarded by outmoded dictates of positive morality and Jaw. 167 As literary comic narrative moves from "ritual bondage" and toward the idealistic, communal utopia of "pragmatic freedom,"l6& so political and legal
liberalism insist that history and our legal institutions progress inevitably
toward a happy ending. The world of "ritual bondage" is the artificially
rule-bound world of legal science and formalistic jurisprudence. This
stale old world of legal formalism suffers from an abundance of rules
drawn with fetishistic precision, rules often substantively unrelated to the
social world in which they operate. 169 They stunt rather than further the
16S See tellt accompanying notes 182·85 infra.
166 See 1.5. Mill, Utilitarianism, in Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government
32·53 (Everyman's Library ed. 1951). Adam Smith also firmly believed that OUf nalura! ca·
pacity for sympathy was at least as crucial 10 social living as our inclination to trade. See A.
Smith, supra note 138. Evidence is mounting that the communitarian "moral sense" position
of Ihe Scoltish Enlightenment heavily influenced Jeffersoo and the other tb.inkers of his era.
See generally G. Wills, Inventing America: J eft"er$Oo's Declaration of Independence 167·259
(1978).
16' This position can perhaps be more easily recognized when viewed in the following way.
The legal realists' insight of the 1930's and 1940's was generally accompanied by the empirical
claim that the envisioned judicial activism was not a bad thing. Holmes, Llewellyn, Frank,
Lasswell, and McDougal all believed that judges wield considerable power, and with clearer
Ihinking could do so more wisely; none suggested that their power be curtailed.
However, this faith in the essential integrity of nonelected political figures and the positive
portrayal of human nature that faith entailed would be out of place in today's far more skepti.
cal intellectual climate. The modem critical Jegal studies movement is considerably more ell'
plicit in its communitarian commitments. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 130, at 411-16.
168 N. Frye, supra note 4, at 169·70.
169 For a classic discussion of this claim, see Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 Cornell
L.Q. 17,20 (1924).
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immediate happiness of the community. resting on an illusion of static
certainty. Law in liberalism's new world, by contrast, embodies the
"pragmatic freedom" which Frye describes as the resolution of dramatic
comedy.I7O Law in the new world abandons academic, formalistic think
iog; it stems directly from the group or individual affected by the rule in
question. 171 The situs of such law making is either the democratic legislative assembly, where rules respond directly to the interests and demands of the governed, the courts, where rules are formed and reformed
around immediate facts, fitted to shifting equities and free to change with
changing policies, or the individual, where rules of conduct can respond
to the changing values imposed by individuals themselves. Thus, the new
community's laws reflect only the sense of the community and the spirit
of the individual-nothing else. l72 Liberal jurisprudence has the same
methodological range as narrative comedy. At one extreme, the roman~
tic liberal theorist embraces society through the " method of innocence":
he analogizes the apocalyptic, communitarian myth to the present world
through an ahistorical, " neutral" version of the nature of the world. 173
At the other extreme, the ironic liberal theorist embraces society through
the "method of realism": experience teaches that concrete community is
more conducive to happiness than the isolated world of the imagina~
tionP4 Thus, the liberal's optimism is acquired either by an ahistoric,
willful ignorance of history, or through an experienced understanding of
the nature of community and its natural limitations:
M

170 See N. Frye, supra note 4, at 169-70.
171 See O.W. Holmes, supra note 3, at 1-2.
172 In addition to the work of the law and economics movement, which has made this principle its guiding light. see B. Ackerman, supra note 3. Ackennan proceeds from a similar
assumption but then reaches dramatically divergent conclusions. Dworkin has also embraced
a form of the thesis that we cannot evaluate the worth or goodness of plans of life chosen by
others. Dworkin, Liberalism, in Public and Private Morality 113, 127-43 (S. Hampshire ed.
1978).
17l The ahistoricism of romantic liberalism has left it vulnerable to critics from all ends of
the political spectrum. See generally the essays from th e critical legal studies movement collected in The Politics of Law (D. Kairys ed. 1983) and the more careful analysis of liberalism's
neutrality principle in ShitTrin, Liberalism, Radicalism and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L.
Rev. 1103 (1983). From the conservative tradition, see the attack on liberalism's shunning of a
community'S contingent, shared morality in favor of individualistic relativism in P. Devlin,
The Enforcement of Morals (1965).
174 IUustrations of this position include Mark Tushnet's adoption of socialist principles and
Duncan Kennedy's "existential" embrace of altruism. See Tushnet, supra note 130, at 424;
Kennedy, supra note 130, at 1717-22.
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LIBERALISM
(Comedy)
(Apocalyptic, Communitarian Assessment of Legal Institutions)

Method of Innocence: Ahistorical
optimistic romanticization of
legal institutions, e.g., the
Constitution, the individual,
or the courts

Method of Experience: Empirically
based optimistic assessment of
the grounding of our
institutions, e.g., the
perceived altruistic or
communitarian nature of humanity

NATURAL LAW _ _ _ _ _---1_ _ _ _ _ __

POSITIVISM

(Romance)

1.

(Irony)

Romantic Comedy: Liberalism and the Method of Innocence

Ronald Dworkin's Herculean jurisprudential construct rests quite
overtly on the romantic side of liberalism. In this respect, it is representative of the narrative form of the vast bulk of our constitutional jurisprudence. In Taking Rights Seriously, Dworkin gives us not only a
romantic-liberal narrative, but a romantic hero as well, the judge he calls
Hercules,l7s Dworkin's substantive view of society is clearly comic:
Hercules's world is liberal, apocalyptic, and intensely communitarian.
At the highest level, Hercules's "law" is simply the shared moral consensus of the community. 176 In Frye's terms, Dworkin's narrative method is
just as clearly romantic: Hercules rules over a dream world that occasionally "collides with the stumbling and blinded follies of the world of
experience ... with its idiotic marriage law ... [its] plots and intrigues. . . ."177 By Herculean effort, Dworkin's hero manages to "impose the form of desire" on the inaccuracies and idiocies of law. 178 This
imposition elevates the reader "from a lower world of confusion to an
upper world of order," enabling her to "see the action" from "the point
of view of a higher and better ordered world."179 Dworkin's story is a
highly formalized kind of American romantic and comic jurisprudence,
less rule-bound and yet more orderly than other, less romantic comic
visions. ISO
m R. Dworkin, supra note 3, at 105.
id. at 90-94.
117 See N. Frye. supra note 4, at 183-84.
178 See id. at 184.
179 See id.
ISO Dworkin's heroic judge decides cases on the basis of enduring principles. By contrast,
176 See, e.g.,
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Although Dworkin's Hercules and his orderly legal world are repre~
sentative of most romantic liberalism, it is tbe liberal's heavily ritualized,
romanticized story of the "individual"-the freely contracting, self~de
termining economic and political man-that lies on liberalism's "last
phase" romantic fringe. Again, Dworkin relies upon narrative to make
the argument. To understand liberalism truly. Dworkin has recently argued, we must imagine, with help from the narrative hypothetical, how a
group of shipwrecked, artificially equalized individuals would divide the
resources that they have discovered on their luckily plentiful deserted
island:
Suppose a number of shipwreck survivors are washed up on a
desert island which has abundant resources and no native population,
and any likely rescue is many years away. These immigrants accept
the principle that no one is antecedently entitled to any or these
resources, but that they shall instead be divided equally among
them . . . .
Now suppose some one immigrant is elected to achieve the divi·
sion according to that principle. . ..
. . .Suppose the divider hands each or the immigrants an equal
and large number or clamshells, which are sufficiently numerous and in
themselves valued by no one, to use as counters in a market or the
following sort. Each distinct item on the island ... is listed as a lot to
be sold, unless someone notifies the auctioneer. . . of his or her desire
to bid ror some part of an item, including part, for example, of some
piece of land, in which case that part becomes itself a distinct lot. The
auctioneer then proposes a set of prices for each lot and discovers
whether that set of prices clears all markets, that is, whether there is
only one purchaser at that price and all lots are sold. If not, then the
auctioneer adjusts his prices until he reaches a set that does clear the
markets. But the process does not stop then, because each of the im·
migrants remains free to change his bids even when an initially mar·
ket·clearing set of prices is reached, or even to propose different lots.
But let us suppose that in time even this leisurely process comes to an
end, everyone declares himself satisfied, and goods are distributed
accordingly. l S I

It is Dworkin's story, not his ultimate argument, that is of interest
here. The story sets the aesthetic parameters of the debate. Drawing
upon a modern tradition rooted in the writings of John Rawls, Dworkin
defines liberalism in terms of a mythic, radically ahistorical narrative.
Shipwrecked islanders are uniquely disassociated from their past as well
the far more human judges of Hart and Sacks decide cases on the basis of "greener," freely
formed and temporary policies. H . Hart & A. Sacks. The Legal Process: Basic Problems in
the Making and Application of Law 457· 515 (tent. ed. 1958).
181 Dworkin, supra note 3, at 285·87 (footnotes omitted).
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as uniquely bound together in purpose. Even more striking, Dworkin's
islanders have happened upon a plentiful island. Their problem really is
one of fairness and not survival. Liberalism explicitly emerges as the
most logical ending of a half-told story.
Bruce Ackerman's imaginative construct takes the same narrative
technique several steps further toward liberalism's romantic fringe. Instead of "forests in moonlight, secluded valleys and happy islands," IB2
Ackerman puts his liberal citizens in the twenty-first century equivalent-a spaceship.IB) Ultimately, these fictive characters agree upon
liberalism as a just principle of distribution. Like Shakespeare's Miranda
and like Dworkin, Ackerman analogizes his apocalyptic, imaginative
myth to our own world by making romantic assumptions about the nature of the real world's inhabitants and the physical world. But whereas
Dworkin's assumptions are consistently upbeat-Dworkin's island is
plentiful and its inhabitants cooperative-the physical world for Ackerman's space travelers is characterized by scarcity. The spaceship's inbabitants-even the relatively altruistic ones-are concerned with
protecting their own interests. Thus Ackerman's bleak starting image:
So long as we live, there can be no escape from the struggle for
power. Each of us must control his body and the world around it.
However modest these personal claims. they are forever at risk in a
world of scarce resources. Someone, somewhere. will-if given the
chance-take the food that sustains or the heart that beats within.
Nor need such acts be attempted for frivolous reasons-perhaps my
heart is the only thing that will save a great woman's life, my food
sufficient to feed five starving men. No one can afford to remain passive while competitors stake their claims. Nothing will be left to reward such self-restraint. Only death can purchase immunity from
hostile claims to the power I seek to exercise. IB4
Ackerman then introduces the most creative and optimistic component of his undisplaced myth to resolve the dilemma on the side of comic
liberalism. In his imaginary. perfectly liberal state, romanticized. rational individuals exchange their ideas, arguments, and claims to goods
in a neutral and orderly dialectic fashion, thereby increasing the rationality and fairness of the community, just as the exchange of goods and
services increases its material wealth. Despite these thinly stretched resources, the citizens are ultimately as cooperative as Dworkin's shipwrecked is1anders. Ackerman's narrative description of justice in his
mythical, ahistoric, and morally neutral liberal state is, at root, a story
181 See N. Frye. supra note 4, at 185.
18] B. Ackerman, supra note 3, at 31.
184 Id. at 3.
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about the appearance such a romantic and radically counterfactual world
would have:
Even when our power is relatively secure, however. it is never beyond challenge in a world where total demand outstrips supply. And
it is this challenge that concerns us here. Imagine someone stepping
forward to claim control over resources you now take for granted. According to her, it is she, not you, who has the better right to claim
them. . . . How can you justify the powers you have so comfortably
exercised in the past?
. . .If I succeed in suppressing the questioner, I may hope to live
as if my power had never been challenged at all.
It is a tempting prospect which becomes more seductive as my
effective power increases. Power corrupts: the more power I have, the
more I can lose by trying to answer the question of legitimacy; the

more power I have, the greater the chance that my effort at suppression will succeed-at least for the time that remains before I die. Yet
this is not the path I mean to follow . . . What would our social world

look like if no one ever suppressed another's question of legitimacy,
where every questioner met with a conscientious attempt at an
answer?l"
As is typical of the romantic-comic norm, the characters imagined
by Ackennan move from a claustrophobically fetishistic and formalistic
society into the fresh air of a well-ordered "pragmatic freedom." History, for Ackerman and other romantic liberals, moves inevitably toward
a less rule-bound society,l86 just as comedy moves inevitably toward a
happy and free society.
2.

Ironic Comedy: Liberalism and the Method of Experience

At its other methodological extreme, the liberal vision is coupled
with the "method of experience." The experiential liberal, like Shakespeare's Prospera, asserts the empirical claim that, despite our failings,
we have the potentia] to progress toward community. Consequently, the
ironic liberal's embrace of community is far more tentative than the romantic liberal's: the ironist knows the contingency-and hence the fragility-of the social bond. For the ironic liberal it is our natural
communitarianism, not an abstract and neutral "individualism," that underlies our social transactions. The tentativeness, the sensitivity to the
absurd, the knowledge that the demonic is never far away, the careful
embrace of human nature, the insistence upon verifiable fact, the concern
for the future, and finally the belief in the acceptability, sociability, and
ISS Id. at 3-4 (empbasis added).
1&6 See Coast, The Problem of Social Cost. 3 J.L . .t Econ. I (1960).
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the rationality of desire all underlie both experiential liberalism and
ironic-comic narrative.
On its most ironic fringe, comedy borders tragedy. Such ironic
comedy rejects but is very much aware of the undisplaced demonic myth
provided by the world of experience. As discussed above, most, but by
no means all, of the critical legal studies scholarship as well as some legal
realist literature corresponds to Frye's most ironic stage of realistic comedy.'87 The critical theorist, such as Tushnet, either describes a humorous and potentially harmful world that ultimately triumphs over the
proffered norm, or else describes such a world and then escapes from
it, 188 just as Jim escapes but does not conquer the slave society in Huckleberry Finn. In this phase of liberalism, as in this phase of comedy, the
grounds for optimism are at their most tenuous. As Frye puts it, "the
sense of the demonic world is never far away."189
Most of the legal realist writings and some of the critical legal scholarship, however, evince the realistic, liberal attributes of the ironic-comic
narrative form despite both movements' avowed disaffection for "liberalism." First, the critical scholar and the realist both focus on the breaking up of fossilized, formalistic rules, a focus Frye describes as common
to all of comedy.l90 Second, both relentlessly insist on experience, an
insistence which Frye describes as common to all of irony. t9t And third,
the realist and the critical legal scholar both assert the existence of a
"true social community" underneath the formalized rules. The existence
of such a community is crucial to the comic-ironic narrative norm.
Duncan Kennedy explains this convergence when he notes the recurrent
coupling of antiformalism with the discovery of communalism recurrent
in realistic jurisprudential storytelling:
It may be useful to take, as a beginning text, the following passage
from the Kessler and Gilmore Contracts casebook:
The eventual triumph of the third party beneficiary idea may be
looked on as still another instance of the progressive liberalization
or erosion of the rigid rules of the late nineteenth century theory
of contractual obligation. That such a process bas been going on
throughout this century is so clear as to be beyond argument. . . . To the nineteenth century legaJ mind the propositions
that no man was his brother's keeper, that the race was to the
swift and that the devil should take the hindmost seemed not only
obvious but morally right. The most striking feature of nineteenth century contract theory is the narrow scope of sociaJ duty
187 See text accompanying notes 79-132 supra.
188 Tushnet, supra note 130, at 416-26.

18'J N. Frye. supra note 4. at 178.
190 Id. at 167-70.
191 Id. at 223.
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which it implicitly assumed. In our own century we have witnessed what it does not seem too fanciful to describe as a socialization of Qur theory of contract.
My purpose is to examine the relationship between the first and
last sentences of the quoted passage. What is the connection between
the "erosion of the rigid rules of the late nineteenth century theory of
contractual obligation" and the "socia/iz1Jtion of our theory of contract?"192

From the standpoint of narrative, it is not surprising that the legal
realist typically opposed not only the romanticists' insistence upon doctrine, but also the rigid isolated individualism of romantic liberalism.
This opposition correlates with the ironic-cornie's opposition to comic as
well as tragic romance. The iramst methodologically opposes abstraction: law is grounded not in deduced, ahistorical, neutral-principled generality, but in particular, contingent facts inductively drawn from
experience. The comic ironist is also drawn to the comic vision of social
unification: the foundation of law is not the abstract individual but the
particular attribute of communitarianism; it is not the "Rule of Law"
but our ability to build linguistic and evaluative bridges of shared meaning that makes community possible and desirable. Our shared moral
world reinforces and reflects that interdependence. Therefore, we must
understand our dependence upon each other before we can understand
the "separateness" or the "otherness" upon which formalists and rights
theorists mistakenly insist. 193
Pure liberalism is poised delicately between these jurisprudential
methods of innocence and experience, just as pure comedy is poised between romance and irony. Liberalism in its simplest form paradoxically
asserts a naive faith in experience-a nonscientific faith in science-coupled with a more specific experiential belief that communities exist and
will progress precisely because we can trust our natural instincts. Morris
Cohen eloquently explained and defended this liberal optimism about
forty years ago,194 Cohen's explication of the liberal's insistence on a
192 Kennedy, supra note 130, at 1686-87.
[Clommunities of understanding are painstakingly created by people who enter into certain kinds of relations and share certain kinds of experiences. . . . (W]e must develop a
shared system of meanings to make either interpretivism or neutral principles coherent.
But in developing such a system, we will destroy the need for constitutional theory,
predicated as that need is on liberal individualism; the problem identified by Hobbes,
Locke, and liberal thought in general disappears in a society in which such a shared
understanding exists. In the end we may decide to retrieve individualism in order to
reaffirm its insistence on the otherness of other people, but we can do so only after we
have thought through the implications of our dependence on each other.
Tushnet. Following the Rules Laid Down; A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Princi·
pies, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781. 826-27 (1983).
194 See M. Cohen, The Faith or a Liberal (1946).
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connection between experientialism and faith in human nature l95-the
convergence of irony and romance through comedy-is in many ways an
echo of Frye's description of the pure comedic norm.

B.

Tragedy and Statism: The Inevitability of Conflict

Frye describes the tragic vision as dominated by an inevitable conflict between human inclination and the demands of natural law. 196 The
familiar tragic dilemma is a conflict between a protagonist's heroic will to
19~

Cohen set forth the ellperiential focus of liberalism as follows:
[T]he aim of liberalism is to liberate the energies of human nature by the free and
fearless use of reason. Liberalism disregards rules and dogmas that hinder the freedom
of scientific inquiry and the questioning of all accepted truths. Prophets, priest1y hierarchies, sacred books, and sanctified traditions must submit their claims to the court of
human reason and experience. In this way mankind wins freedom from superstitious
fears. such as that of magic or witchcraft, and from arbitrary and crucl restraints on
human happiness.
Id. at 439. At the same time, he acknowledged that liberalism's decision to submit claims to
the court of reason and experience rested on a faith in human progress and toleration.
Through this faith, liberalism rebutted the view that "human nature is profoundly and radicaUy sinful and corrupt," a view that led to an "excessive reguJation of life by governments."
Id. at 449.
The belief in progress was a reaction against such a point of view. The believers in
progress said: "No, human flesh is not originally corrupt. To be sure, man commits sins
and crimes. You cannot deny that. But that is due to the bad institutions under which
we live. If you cowd only wipe out the evil institutions undcr which man has lived,
human nature wowd assert itself."
Id. at 449-50.
196 N. Frye, supra note 4, at 208.
As for the something beyond, its names are variable but the fonn in which it
manifests itself is fairly constant. Whether the contellt is Greek, Christian, or undefined,
tragedy seems to lead up to an epiphany of law, of that which is and must be. It can
hardly be an accident that the two great developments of tragic drama, in fifth-century
Athens and in seventeenth-c:entury Europe, were contemporary with the rise of Ionian
and of Renaissance science. In such a world-view nature is seen as an impersonal
process which human law imitates as best it can, and this direct relation of man and
natural law is in the foreground.

Id.
It is the admixture of heroism that gives tragedy its characteristic splendor and
exhilaration. The tragic hero has nonnally had an extraordinary, often a nearly divine,
destiny almost within his grasp, and the glory of that original vision never quite fades
out of tragedy. The rhetoric of tragedy requires the noblest diction that the greatest
poets can produce, and while catastropbe is the normal end of tragedy, this is balanced
by an equally significant original greatness, a paradise lost
Id. at 270.
And just as comedy often sets up an arbitrary law and tben organizes the action to
break or evade it, so tragedy presents the reverse theme of narrowing a comparatively
rree life into a process of causation. The discovery . . . which comes at the end of the
tragic plot is . . . the recognition of the determined shape of the life . . . (tbe hero] bas
created for himself, with an implicit comparison witb the uncreated potential life he bas
forsaken.
Id. at 212.
HeinOnline -- 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 195 1985

Imaged with the Penni~~ioll ofN.Y.U. Law Review

(Vol. 6O:14S

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

196

power and the hierarchy mandated by a felt natural order.I\l1
Like comedy. tragedy has received both idealistic and realistic treatment from literary narrators. Frye explains that in the romantic stages
of tragedy. the bero's innocence, faith, or reason is pitted against, and
ultimately transforms, a decadent. evil, or fetishistic dominant group. By
contrast, in the ironic phases of tragedy, the hero's attributes fail to sway
the antagonists. The "hero" occupies the same debased level as the other
characters of the social group, all of whom are lower than the audience.
These phases parallel irony's themes of loss of freedom, relentless determinism, and hopelessness.
Tragedy's methodological range can be pictured in the following
way:

ROMANCE------------r-----------Method of Innocence

IRONY

Method of Experience

TRAGEDY
One recurrent, although never dominant, body of jurisprudential
narrative presupposes the tragic character of our social world. Because
of a flawed human nature, the commands of positive law and the dictates
of morality are more likely to diverge than to converge. Like the apocalyptic myth of liberalism, this demonic, tragic view of human nature and
the state has received both realistic and idealistic treatment from legal
thinkers; however, unlike the liberal vision, very little of the tragic vision
can be found in traditional legal literature. The statist who employs a
positivist method is confined by his experiential premises: law is as it is,
and it is power. By contrast, the tragedian who embarks methodologically on the romantic quest is free to deny the pressing reality of suffering, and may assert instead the deeper reality of dimly perceived
alternative apocalyptic worlds. The pain we feel is temporal. What is
permanent is another world-either an afterlife or a postrevolutionary
197 Id. at 214-15.
Anyone accustomed to think archetypally of literature will recognize in tragedy a
mimesis of sacrifice. Tragedy is a paradoxical combination of a fearful sense of rightness
(the hero must fall) and a pitying sense of wrongness (it is too bad that he falls) . . . .
IJ1ust as the literary critic finds Freud most suggestive for the theory of comedy, and
Jung for the theory of romance, so for the theory of tragedy one naturally looks to the
psychology of the will to power, as eJ[pclunded in Adler and Nietxsche. Here one finds a
"Oionysiac" aggressive will, intoxicated by dreams of its own omnipotence. impinging
upon an "Apollonian" sense of extemal and immovable order.
Id. (emphasis added).
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apocalyptic utopia-in which positive and natural law converge. To feel
suffering, whether revolutionary or spiritual, and still to insist upon the
romantic myth that ultimately all is as it ought to be. is to deny the
present and to affirm a transcendent reality.
The methodological range of jurisprudential tragedy can be
diagrammed in this way:
NATURAL LAW - - - - - - - - , , - - - - - - - POSITIVISM

(Romance)

(Irony)

(Method of Transcendental
Pessimism) The
antihislorical insistence
upon a future utopia;
Civil Disobedience;
Revolution

(Method of Experiential
Pessimism) The
deterministic insistence
'upon the necessity of the
status quo; nihilism;
sophistry; professionalism

STATISM
(Tragedy)

1.

Visions of Hopelessness: Ironic Tragedy

Viewed as narrative, ironic-tragic jurisprudence. like ironic-tragic
literature, harbors an aesthetic mood of hopelessness. Society is and will
always be the penal colony, whose inhabitants are both the condemned
and the officers. One might think that salvation from the knowledge that
our true potential is for cruelty and our true destiny to suffer could be
religious: St. Augustine's natural law thesis, for example, which is based
upon the tragic but intensely romantic Biblical myth of the Fall. 198 An
ironic, positivist, experiential methodology, however, removes the option
of religious salvation. Assuming a relentlessly tragic world view and a
realistic method, there is literally no exit from the tragic insight that the
actual purpose of positive law is not to liberate but to oppress.
Franz Kafka best expresses the nature of law from an ironic-tragic
point of view. In The Problem 0/ Our Laws,199 Kafka describes a legal
world in which the "nobles"-the lawmakers and administrators-have
198 See Augusline, The City of God, Book XIV, at 457·64 (Modem Library ed. 1950).
199 F. Kafka, The Problem orour Laws, in Parables 119 (1947).
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"privileged access" to the laws. The "nobles" have no reason to manipu~
late law to advance their own interest, however, for the simple reason
that the laws have always favored this interest:
Our laws are not generally known; they are kept secret by the
small group of nobles who rule us. We are convinced that these an~
cient laws are scrupulously administered; nevertheless, it is an extremely painful thing to be ruled by laws that one does not know. I am
not thinking of possible discrepancies that may arise in the interpretation of the laws, or of the disadvantages involved when only a few and
not the whole people are allowed to have a say in their interpretation.
These disadvantages are perhaps of no great importance. For the laws
are very ancient; their interpretation has been the work of centuries,
and has itself doubtless acquired the status of law; and though there is
still a possible freedom of interpretation left, it has now become very
restricted. Moreover the nobles have obviously no cause to be influenced in their interpretation by personal interests inimical to us, for
the laws were made to the advantage of the nobles from the very beginning, they themselves stand above the laws, and that seems to be why
the laws were entrusted exclusively into their hands. 2OO

In such a world, "tradition" has it that the laws exist and "are a
mystery confided to the nobility."201 A small minority of dissenting legal
theorists, however, occasionally deny the existence of true "law," seeing
instead only the arbitrary actions of the nobility. Kafka's "minority of
dissent" propounds both the method and the central experiential insight
of the American legal realist and critical legal studies movements:
Some of us. . . have attentively scrutinized the doings of the nobility since the earliest times and possess records made by our forefathers-records which we have conscientiously continued-and claim
to recognize amid the countless number of facts certain main tendencies which permit of this or that historical formulation; but when in
accordance with these scrupulously tested and logically ordered conclusions we seek to orient ourselves somewhat toward the present or
the future, everything becomes uncertain, and our work seems only an
intellectual game, for perhaps these laws that we are trying to unravel
do not exist at all. There is a small party who are actually of this
opinion and who try to show that, if any law exists, it can only be this:
The Law is whatever the nobles do. This party see everywhere only
the arbitrary acts of the nobility, and reject the popular tradition,
which according to them possesses only certain trifling and incidental
advantages that do not offset its heavy drawbacks, for it gives the people a false, deceptive, and over-confident security in confronting coming events. . . . [B1ut the overwhelming majority of our people
200 Id.
201 Id.
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account for it by the fact that the tradition is far from complete and
must be more fully enquired into, that the material available, prodigious as it looks, is still too meager, and that several centuries will have
to pass before it becomes really adequate. 202
If a party were to denounce the existence of the nobility, Kafka concludes, it would have the support of the people. And yet-and here the
tragic implications of Kafka's irony far exceed those of the irony employed by even critical legal scholars-such a movement can never truly
come to fruition, for no one can truly denounce the nobility. To do so
would be to denounce the one unquestionable law we do have-the law
of the nobility-and we cannot deprive ourselves of that one reliable law.
Following Kafka's logic, it is a part of our nature to submit, not to a
loving authority, as the romantic natura11awyer has it, but to a cruel one:
This [traditional] view, so comfortless as far as the present is concerned, is lightened only by the belief that a time will eventually come
when the tradition and our research into it will jointly reach their conclusion . . . when everything will have become clear, the law will belong to the people, and the nobility will vanish. This is not maintained
in any spirit of hatred against the nobility; not at all, and by no one.
We are more inclined to hate ourselves, because we have not yet shown
ourselves worthy of being entrusted with the laws. And that is the real
reason why the party which believe that there is no law have remained
so small. . . for it unequivocally recognizes the nobility and its right
to go on existing.
Actually one can express the problem only in a sort of paradox:
Any party that would repudiate, not only all belief in the laws, but the
nobility as well, would have the whole people behind it; yet no such
party can come into existence, for nobody would dare to repudiate the
nobility. . . . The sole visible and indubitable law that is imposed
upon us is the nobility, and must we ourselves deprive ourselves of that
one iaw?203

It is one thing, of course, to describe our legal world in tragic-ironic
tones, another entirely to endorse the laws such a mythology inspires.
Few, if any, modem American theorists would overtly justify oppression
with the straightforward assertion that human nature is at root unavoidably sadistic and complementarily masochistic. The unrecognized and
unacknowledged presence of an ironic-tragic sensibility may, however, he
precisely what has left our legal community so habitually unaccustomed
to forming normative judgments of good and evil. In the name of "law"
and "legalism" we tolerate much evil: Nazis marching in a town of Holocaust survivors; literature, film, and speech depicting the violent and
202 Id. at 119-21.
101 Id. at 121-23.
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graphic degradation of women; the continuing creation of an ever more

firmly entrenched economic subterranean undercIass. The danger we
must face is that our tolerance of evil will blind us to it.
In the middle of this century. the German legal philosopher Gustav
Radbruch warned his colleagues that legal positivism, though the sword
of the English legal reformer, often becomes the protective shield of the
coward when the positive law it analyzes ought to be not merely reformed, but denounced and defied. 204 The Germanic positivism Radbruch feared embraced state supremacy and exclusivity in much the
same way that modem positivist legal practitioners in America embrace
political and economic individualism. For the German positivist and increasingly for this American legal nobility, the world of law exhausts the
formal, objective normative universe. 2os For both, then, there is no nor~
mative ground upon which the legal world can be judged as good or bad:
law is what is real and law is all that is real. Radbruch warned that in
this moral nihilism and resignation could be found a partial explanation
for the German legal profession's failure to condemn the totalitarianism
of the Nazi state.206 Our own legal profession, although not faced with a
similarly clear~cut moral crisis, at times exhibits a similar moral paralysis
and resigned moral relativism. 201

2.

Romantic Tragedy: Transcendental Jurisprudence and the
Tragedian's Jurisprudential Contribution

The tragedian who undertakes the romantic quest is freed from both
the lessons of experience and from the habit of moral impotence. A fa~
miliar body of classic tragic narrative centers on the dilemma of the citi~
zen subjected to the demands of a legal order that conflict with a higher
moral or divine imperative. The romantic tragedian transcends both the
contingent constraints of history and the moral stagnation it entails,
either through thought, prayer, death, or, ultimately, resurrection. Soph~
oeles's Antigone expresses both her tragic dilemma and its romantic res~
olution in this passage:
I did [transgress the law) for such
Commands came not from Zeus and have no force
With me, nor was it Justice, dweller with
The god below, who issued them. For they
Were verily the gods who, for all time
Established on the earth the very laws
21M See Radbrucb, supra note 33, at 78·87.
205 See id. at 201·07.
206 Id. at 219·26.
:z07 See, e.g., Adler, How Much Loyalty Does S22 Million Buy?, Am. Law., July/Aug.
1984, at 105; Brill, The Ultimate Insider's Game, Am. Law., May 1984, at 1.
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In strict accord with which I act. Nor are
Your proclamations of such power that you
Of mortal birth, can hope to nullify
Th' unwritten and unerring laws of Heaven,
For not alone today nor yesterday
/Ue these unfailing laws in force. In all
Past time they lived and to eternity
Will they endure, nor knoweth anyone
Where came they into being, nor did I,
Through fear of any mortal's stubborn will
And arrogance, desire to bring upon
Myself a punishment forth from the Gods'
Stem hands for breaking these their laws. Yea true,
I knew full well I must die. Why not,
Tho' you had not proclaimed it and if I
Should die before my time I count it gain,
For how could death be other than a gain
To one who lives as I do in the midst
Of multitudes of woes? Thus it is that
To me at least it is no grief to chance
Upon tbis fate, but, had I let my own
Dear mother's son in death unbmied lie
Most sore distress would then have overwhelmed
My troubled mind but this disturbs me not
Nor causes me to feel one whit of pain.
But if I seem to you to act the part
Of folly, then may I say that the man
Who charges me with folly acts himself
With greater foolishness. 208
Viewed as narrative, at least a part of the natural law tradition born
of tragedy shares the assumptions of this literature. When faced with an
immora1 state and a tragic dilemma, the modern romantic actor tests the
legality or constitutionality of the law through disobedience to dramatize
and urge the correction of its evil content; he may even foment revolution
in order to purge society of the evil. The classically tragic response is
quite different, however: the classic tragic hero might disobey the flawed
legal system, but she does so through allegiance-obedience-to a higher
moral command. Unlike the romantic, the tragedian perceives her illega1
conduct not as a freely chosen means of dramatizing and ultimately correcting a flawed lega1 order, but as the sole moral alternative; for her,
there is no truly human choice. The tragedian is not engaging in a free
political act, thereby affirming the reformed future of the flawed system
within which the act occurs. She is engaging in a necessary moral,
200 Sophocles, Antigone 24-25 (C.W. Robinson trans. 1958).
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human act, and thereby affirming a higber morality and her own obedience to it. Tragedy tending toward romance aims us toward the rearticulation of a vision of utopia after having experienced hell. It does not,
however, claim to deliver us.
The tragic extremes of OUf civil rights and civil disobedience movements provide us with some modern examples of this sort of tragic heroism. Unlike her romantic counterpart, the tragic civil disobedient has
little faith that the disobedient act will ultimately reform or even revolutionize the flawed present system. The tragic disobedient, like the tragic
hero, claims instead obedience to a higber order or ideal as her purpose,
and freedom from history, pain, suffering, and even death as her method
of action.
With the major exceptions of the literature that emerged from the
civil disobedience movement209 and the briefs written in the Nuremberg
trials,210 however, visions for civilization born of felt conflicts between
legal and higher commands have not proven to be an aesthetic sensibility
that has sparked the imagination of modem legal theorists. One could
reach the curiously false impression from legal literature that the story of
our modern legal development has been one of almost uninterrupted convergence of moral and legal orders. This is our loss: we need to understand the utopian visions of those who have suffered at the hands of law
while remaining true to a higher ideal. We need to understand. for example, the centrality of the command of love to the utopian jurisprudence of the civil rights tradition-and how it differs from the
eighteenth-century revolutionary's faith in reason. More generally, we
need to understand the societies envisioned as well as remembered by
Holocaust victims and survivors, Vietnam veterans, Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors, political prisoners, abused family members, and the victims of crime, war, torture, and poverty. The future of community
depends not just upon political or even revolutionary action. It also depends upon our imaginative, rational, spiritual, and moral freedom to
break free of our present, and to conceive of other ideal worlds.
What we might learn from this overlooked jurisprudential literature
is that we must do more than simply decide that we are naturally communitarian or individualistic, selfish or altruistic. We must envision our
true, ideal nature, and then prove the viability as well as the beauty of
those visions, by living the lives we profess. Only then will we have begun the work of transfonning our dreams into reality.
209 Sec generally Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice (H. Bedau cd. 1969); Revolution
and the Rule or Law (E. Kent cd. 1971).
210 Sec R. Jackson, The Nuremberg Case (Together with other Documents) 30-94 (1947).
For a bibliograpby of literature about the war crimes tribunals, see J. Lewis, Uncertain Judgment: A Bibliography of War Crimes Trials (1979).
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V
LEGAL THEORY AS NARRATIVE: CONCLUSIONS

The correlation established in this Article between jurisprudential
traditions and aesthetic myths supports two separate theses. First, and
most generally, it demonstrates that our legal theory has an aesthetic
dimension which can be separately and meaningfully studied. It is an
increasingly common observation that our legal theory is in some important sense " utopian," " visionary," or "aesthetic."211 We should begin to
take this aesthetic dimension of legal theory seriously. Traditional, fictive
narration-storytelling-plays a curiously central role in jurisprudence.
The stories that theorists such as Holmes, Fuller, and Dworkin tell are
not simply ornamental; they are central to-they even constitute-each
writer's conception of law. By reading these jurisprudential stories systematically and critically as stories, we may achieve a richer understanding of the philosophical arguments those anecdotes are meant to convey.
Jurisprudence is part history, part vision, and part method,212 as is literary narrative. As such it has aesthetic components, including plot, that
can and should be understood separately. This Article has attempted to
bring those overtly narrative components of legal theory-plot, characterization, imagery, and mood-into the foreground.
Second, and more particularly, the correlation suggests that Northrop Frye's formalistic theory of narrative categories can shed new light
on the substantive debates that presently dominate jurisprudential literature. Each of our four jurisprudential traditions expounds a story with a
"plot" closely mirroring Frye's description of either the comic, tragic,
romantic, or ironic myths. Legal theorists, as storytellers, combine narrative method with vision in precisely the way Frye describes. That aesthetic combination of method and vision may account for our most
persistent jurisprudential ambiguities. Thus, Frye demonstrates that a
narrative romance might reveal either a comic or tragic leaning, as might
an ironic narrative, while both tragedy and comedy may tend toward
either a romantic or ironic method. As a result, romantic and tragic
narratives move through successive "phases" ranging from comic to
tragic extremes, and comedy and tragedy, in turn, each range methodologically from romantic to ironic extremes. The ambiguities in legal
theory may be a function of these same tendencies: a natural lawyer
211 See, e.g., Cover, supra note 120; Kelman, The Past and Future of Legal Scbolarship, 33
I , Legal Educ:. 432, 436 (1983); Kelman, Spitzer and Hoffman on Cease: A Brief Rejoinder,
53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1215, 1215, 1221 (1980). There is simultaneously, and certainly not coincidentally, an increased awareness of the role of aesthetic and narrative in moral theory. See A.
MacIntyre, supra note 151, at 190-209.
m See, e.g., G. Paton, A Text-Book of Jurisprudence 141 (D. Derham 3d ed. 1964).
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combines romantic method with either a liberal or statist vision of the
world, whereas the irarust combines realistic method with the same. A
liberal combines optimistic vision with either a positivist or natural methodology, whereas the statist combines either methodology with a pessimistic vision.
Three separate inferences regarding the way we read legal theories
emerge from our analysis of such theories as narrative. First, if legal
theories owe something to our literary imagination, they cannot be fuily
understood and ought not be read as pure philosophical analysis. Second, if legal theories owe something to our literary imagination, they
cannot be properly understood solely as a product of our will. Therefore,
legal theories cannot be understood and ought not be read simply as a
branch of political rhetoric. Third, because legal theories are in part a
product of our literary imagination, they must be read and understood,
in part, as art. Each of these inferences will be discussed in turn.

A.

Contributions to Philosophical Analysis

An aesthetic reading of legal theory can sensitize us to similarities
and distinctions we could not see by reading jurisprudence solely for its
philosophical content. If we are sensitive to the aesthetic dimension of
jurisprudence, we can understand better some long-standing jurisprudential disputes. The debates among major jurisprudential traditions can be
viewed as aesthetic contrasts among competing narrative methods and
visions, and some debates within major jurisprudential traditions can be
viewed as contrasting aesthetic mixtures of vision and method within major narrative categories.
Such debates not only can be viewed aesthetically, but should be. A
narrative account of the debate between the natural law and positivist
traditions in jurisprudence, for example, reveals why this otherwise analytically sterile debate continues to generate passion and interest. Strictly
speaking, the crux of the philosophical conflict between the positivist and
natural law traditions is a transparent and comparatively trivial definitional ambiguity as to the meaning of the word "law." The word can
surely have either a broad (positivist) meaning or a narrow (natural law)
meaning. The positivists define law as a sociological fact, in which caSe
bad commands or unjust rules may qualify as law. Alternatively, natural
law theorists see law as those rules or commands which meet some specified moral criterion. The word "law" is clearly ambiguous, and the competing definitions could in theory both be tolerated.
But it is not the technical, definitional component of the ongoing
debate between legal positivism and natural law that keeps it alive. The
natural law tradition in jurisprudence is not just a particular way of deHeinOnline -- 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 204 1985
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fining words-it is a manifestation of a romantic literary impulse. Similarly, the legal poSitivist tradition is a manifestation of the ironic impulse.
The compelling differences between natural Jaw and positivism arise because of the deep contrast between those narrative tendencies that romanticize the ideal and those that insist ironically upon the real The
natural lawyer and the positivist are not then just differing over the
meaning of the word "law." They are engaging in contrasting aesthetic
projects. The natural lawyer, like the romantic generally, is on a moral
quest: he is determined to idealize, often through metaphor, the actual.:m The positivist is engaged in a different and opposed mission. As
an ironist, the positivist is determined to actualize, often through satire,
the idealized delusions, illusions, and deceptions of the romantic, and to
expose the contingency of our ideas, the particularity of our generalizations, and the historical grounding of our indulgent romanticizations of
our world.:!:I" It is what these theorists are doing, not what they are saying, that accounts for the polarization of their positions.
A narrative approach to jurisprudence also helps us see that aesthetic themes, and not philosophical commitments, truly unify the collection of positions within what we call liberalism, positivism, natural law,
and statism. The current debate over the nature of liberalism provides
the most timely example. Philosophical attempts to identify the essence
of liberalism have been peculiarly unavailing. For example, the fashionable Dworkinian identification of "liberalism" with state neutrality toward competing definitions of the good lifell!l fails to account for
historical liberals who have advocated state sponsorship of a well-defined
account of the good life, from Mill's and later Dewey's vision of the role
of state-sponsored public education in creating a cultured citizenry,l16 to
the state-sponsored abolition of poverty envisioned by the liberal advocates of the New Deal and the Great Society.217 The identification of
liberalism with "individualism" or the "free market" or communitarianism fails similarly. There does not appear to be a single core of philosophical beliefs unifying liberalism; there are instead a multitude of
"liberal" groups, each with its own core beliefs. This does not mean that
liberalism is incoherent, or unsound, or dead, or that it fails. It only
211

See text accompanying notes 47·78 supra.
214 See lext accompanying notes 79·1 16 supra.
21S Dworkin, supra note 172, at 127·28.
216 See J.S. Mill, supra note 166, at 3242. Even in his later advocacy of governmenlal
restraint, Mill recognized the utility of state enforcement, through testing, of educational
objectives. See J.S. Mill, On Liberty, in Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Govern·
ment 210.19 (Everyman's Library ed. 19Si). Dewey's writings on the state and education are
collected in J. Dewey, The Middle Works, 1899·1901 (J.A. Boydston ed. 1976), and in J.
Dev,'ey, John Dewey on Education, Selected Writings (R.D. Archambault ed. 1964).
217 See, e.g., J. Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (1935); Dworkin, supra note 172.
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suggests that what ties the strands of liberalism together is not a shared
philosophy.
A common aesthetic thread and narrative outlook unify the diverse
positions we call liberalism. As a form of comedy, liberalism exudes an
optimistic vision of history, OUI present culture, and our future. Liberalism is the mode of political narrative that insists upon a comic, communal ending. The liberal's quintessential commitment to and faith in
progress reveals his aesthetic insistence upon that ending. Like all comic
narrators, liberals portray human nature as prOfiting from the evolution
of human interaction. To the liberal, restraints on human inclinations,
whether those restraints be legal or moral, are consequently only as
"good" as they are "natural," Liberals whose methods and political
commitments diverge radically share this comic, apocalyptic narrative
vision, from Ackerman and Dworkin's insistence on principled neutrality,ZIS to the New Deal liberals' belief in reasoned reform and progress,219 to the critical legal scholars' radical insistence on contingent
communitarianism. 22o Thus, the philosophical divisions within liberalism
become less bewildering when liberalism is viewed as part of the literature of comedy. All comedy ranges from romance through irony. Consequently, at one methodological extreme liberals insist on historical fact,
yet at the other they rely on idealized metaphor. This range does not
detract, however, from the unity of the central liberal vision. In all of
liberalism as in all of comedy, we progress toward a happy resolution,
toward a celebration of life, community, and nature.
A search for the philosophical core of the diverse philosophical positions that fall under the "natural law" rubric is similarly futile. Saint
Thomas Aquinas flatly rejected a facile identification of legal with moral
norms. 221 A total association of natural law with objective morality has
been disclaimed similarly by Dworkin, who more often identifies natural
law with the nonns of a cross-generational community.222 Most if not all
modem American natural lawyers reject the equation of natural law with
the Blackstonian "common law."223 Again, it does not follow from this
diversity that there is no natural law position, or that natural law is dead
or incoherent. It simply means that the diverse strands of the natural
law tradition are unified more by aesthetic tendencies than by philosophi218 See text accompanying notes 174-86 supra.
219 See text accompanying notes 94-116 supra.
220 See text accompanying notes 117·32 supra.
221 See T. Aquinas, supra note 22, at 75·151 (Questions 94-96). Aquinas's modem inler·
preter, John Finnis, also insists upon the separability of law and morality. See J. Finnis, supra
note 22, at 23-49.
m R. Dworkin, supra DOle 3, at 160-83.
223 See generally E. Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Melhod of the Law
151-62 (1974).
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cal commitments. The full range of the natural law tradition shares with
literary romance the romantic quest for an ideal, an insistence upon a
sharp differentiation between good and evil, a methodological reliance
upon abistorical metaphor, and a willingness to derive from the substance of our desires a description of the apocalyptic goal of history.
Legal positivism similarly reveals an aesthetic unity in the face of
extreme philosophical disunity. Legal positivists are variously moral objectivists, moral relativists, nihilists, utilitarians, deontoiogists and political radicals, liberals, and conservatives. Again, the aesthetic features of
legal positivism unify it as a jurisprudential tradition: a search for contingent, historical truth, a concern for history, a reliance upon factual
anecdote. and an interest in the less than heroic. These shared features
are the aesthetic attitudes, not the philosophical commitments, of the
legal positivist tradition.
B.

Contributions to Political Discourse

Whether the narrative component in legal theory supplements or
masks the theorist's political commitments. as opposed to her philosophical orientation, is a far more difficult question. If legal theory suggests
literary categories that ultimately reflect political divisions, the separate
study of the aesthetics of legal theory may be a needless detour; if the
underlying causes of literary differences are political, one could reveal
more efficiently the fundamental divisions of legal thought by moving
directly to the political underpinnings.
Frye assumes that though literature, like politics, is a product of our
fundamental fears and desires, the literary narrator, unlike the political
actor, is relatively autonomous. Our desires and revulsions-the undisplaced myths-motivate both activities, but it is in literature that our
desires and fears are realized in antihistorical dreams. Political theory
describes the world as the theorist sees it. For Frye, the literary forum
for our desires is thus sharply distinguishable from the historical and the
political. A1though a partojthe worJd,literature is not strictly about the
world. Knowing the literary component of something is not a way of
knowing historical reality. As the formalist insists that legal categories
transcend particular cases, Frye insists that literature is ultimately
"about" something other than the momentary, contingent world.
A1though it evidences our desires and arises from them, ultimately it is
about and only responsible to itself.214
This formalistic characterization of the relationship of political history and literature is as controversial to modem literary theorists as is
legal formalism to modem legal theorists. The modem literary "realist"
224 N. Frye, supra note 4, at 3·29, 350-S4.
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is inclined to see narrative literature not as a self-contained metaphor,
but as essentially as much a description of the world and our place within
it as any historical tract or sociological study. On such a view, there is
no meaningful distinction between literary narrative and any nonfictional
prose. Thus, Teny Eagleton criticizes Frye's Anatomy of Criticism for,
among other things, portraying literature as "not a way of knowing reality but a kind of collective utopian dreaming which has gone on throughout history, an expression of those fundamental human desires which
have given rise to civilization itself, but which are never fully satisfied
there."225 Eagleton goes on to speculate as to why literature is distinguished from history in Frye's theory:
Frye's work emphasizes as it does the utopian root of literature because it is marked by a deep fear of the actual social world, a distaste
for history itself. In literature. and in literature alone. one can shake
off the sordid "externalities" of referential language and discover a
spiritual home. . . . Actual history is for Frye bondage and determinism. and literature remains the one place where we can be free. It is
worth asking what kind of history we have been living through for this
theory to be even remotely convincing. . . . In one sense it is scornfully "anti-humanist," decentring the individual human subject and
centring all on the collective literary system itself; in another sense it is
the work ofa committed Christian humanist (Frye is a clergyman), for
whom the dynamic which drives literature and civilization-desirewill finally be fulfilled only in the kingdom of God. 226
But Eagleton's recapitulation of Frye's vision of literature, intended
critically, is actually revealed in the narrative that appears in legal theory. Jurisprudence surely evidences a profound "distaste for history"
and a "deep fear of the actual social world," and a1so seems to represent,
at least to the theorist, the forum in which we can be free. The persistent
use of the narrative hypothetical highlights the lega1 theorist's antihistorical view of theory. Ackerman'S Commander and Dworkin's Hercules
are nonexistent and ahistoric. They are not descriptions of reality, signs
for that rea1ity or even a "way of knowing reality." Dworkin's Hercules
is not a "sign" for a Supreme Court Justice; Hercules is the romantic
hero of a romantic story. Holmes's "bad man" is no more referential
than is Hercules. The bad man is not a sign for a pathological criminal,
but a figure in Holmes's ironic rendering of legality. The narrative component of jurisprudence, like Frye's description of literature, seems
driven by the "fundamental human desires" that have made civilization
possible, but that have "never been fully satisfied there" and may not be
225 T. Eagleton, Literary Theory 93 (1983).
226 Id.
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fully realizable there. It seems to share with literature the attempt to
articulate both the utopian and the demonic alternatives to history.
Frye's insistence upon the distinctive autonomy and abistoricity of
literature is strengthened, in fact, by the similarity between narrative and
jurisprudential categories. The narrative in jurisprudence does serve a
peculiarly autonomous function: it uniquely allows the theorist to transcend history through imagination and speculation. The correlation also
indicates, of course, that this state of autonomy is not sufficient to bring
forth what we have traditionally called "narrative literature."227 The
same ahistorical bent, and even the same generic plots, are found in our
theoretical writings on the nature of law. We surely can conclude from
this correlation that literature, like legal theory, is merely a branch of
political rhetoric. But we are equally free to infer that legal theory, like
literature, is not a product of our political will alone. In that case, an
understanding of narrative may add a new dimension to our understanding of the values, both political and nonpolitical, underlying legal theory.
C

Imaginative Autonomy and Our Moral Experience of Law

Legal theory is a product not only of our philosophical commitments and political will, but also of our narrative imagination. The relatively autonomous world of narrative provides the legal theorist with
moral freedom to translate dreams and nightmares into narrative stories
of moral choices set in fictive worlds. Reading legal theory as narrative
forces us to focus upon our imaginative choices-our responsibility for
the worlds we, as theorists, create with words.
Narrative vision, more autonomous than philosophical and political
vision, poses choices not open to the empiricist. Similarly, narrative
method poses a choice that philosophical and political analysis often
lacks. Only in recognizing this role of narrative vision and method can
we appreciate the moral significance of our legal theory. The narrative in
legal theory, like all narrative, brings us face to face with our moral
selves, our moral options and our capacity for moral action.
The legal theorist's narrative visions, unlike empirical descriptions
of reality, do not aim for mere accuracy. The comic and tragic undisplaced myths which are the core of narrative do not try to describe the
world accurately. We are not compelled to accept or reject an aesthetic
vision of human nature that appears in a novel or in a legal theory; we
need not accept Dworkin's or Holmes's aesthetic premises any more than
we need accept D.H. Lawrence's depiction of human sexuality. Dworkin's apocalyptic, principled legal heaven is not a world we judge by its
descriptive accuracy. Although based on a more or less articulable de227 Eagleton expresses this view. See id. at 1·16.
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scription of human nature, the description is a part of narrative, not fact.
Dworkin's Hercules is a romantic hero, not a description of ideal judicial
conduct. He is a romanticization of the reasonableness of authority, and
his world romanticizes reason itself. The accuracy of Hercules and his
world is beside the point: rather, we must ask whether the imaginative
vision Dworkin presents is attractive or repulsive, whether it is "true"
not to this world, but to OUf hopes for the world.
Is Hercules genuinely heroic? Do we find his legal world desirable?
Our answers to these questions reveal something about us and the role of
law, authority, and reason in our dreams and nightmares. The narrative
visions that recur in legal theory lead us to focus upon ourselves and the
possibilities we envision for ourselves in a way that strict empiricism does
not allow. The narrative vision in legal theory helps us understand our
own internal experience of the real world and our idealistic hopes for it.
At its best, the descriptive component of the narrative in legal theory can
lead us to reexamine our initial experiences of authority, to reassess our
early reactions to relationships based on reason and power, and to fonnulate a wiser, more self-reflective vision of the future moral possibilities of
the law.
Similarly, the methodological component of legal theory, read as
narrative, reveals a moral choice that a purely analytical reading will
often obscure. We are not "driven" in any sense to choose between romantic and ironic narrative modes. The choice between irony and romance is a free choice between a "method of discovery" of the actual
and a "moral quest" for the ideal. What choice we make depends not on
our philosophical commitments, but on whether we trust the world,
whether we have hope for it, whether we find it interesting and are comfortable in it, and which method we find more useful, more compelling,
more strategic, and even more fun. The theoretical methods to which we
subscribe or with which we feel ourselves in agreement reveal a range of
nonintellectual, affective human experiences and autonomous human
choices.
Our choice of vision and method in legal theory thus reflects our
hopes for the world and our vision of our own role within it. The various
protagonists created by legal theorists are not signs for the virtues and
dangers of legality, any more than a landscape is a roadmap. They are
not about our world-they, like the law itself, are a part of our artificial
world. Like law itself, they are creations of our desires, fears, and imagination. To the extent that legal theory is narrative, however, it is also
art. Therefore we must decide not whether the worlds we envision are
true or false, right or wrong. Rather, we must decide whether they are
attractive or repulsive, beautiful or ugly. OUf acceptance or rejection of
these aesthetic visions will in tum inftuence the historical choices we
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must make. The aesthetic quality of our art, like the quality of our play,
deeply affects our lives: our imaginings are not only a part of our pres~
ent, but a way of determining the limits of our future. This effect can be
quite immediate, for although the literary narrator has a detached rela~
tion to his hero, we have a pronounced habit of quickly becoming the
legal actors we like to imagine.
Of course, not only legal theorists need to be more sensitive to the
aesthetic dimension of their thinking on law. Judges, legislators, and
lawyers also make methodological and visionary choices. and must refer
to their personal histories when formulating a theory of human nature
and social interaction upon which to ground their work. However, there
is an important difference between the legal theorist and the legal actor:
judges, legislators, and lawyers. if acting responsibly, keep these narrative
instincts separate from the act of lawmaking, or at least weigh them
against other institutional concerns.
Legal theorists, on the contrary, can and should give full rein to
their imaginative, utopian instincts. Legal theorists do not make law:
they do not decide cases, vote on bills, or undertake the representation of
clients and hence the furtherance of those clients' interest. Consequently, they have the freedom which institutional responsibility does
not allow; they are a step further removed from history than judges or
legislators. In lieu of the present world, however, theorists can and must
be responsible to the future, imaginable world. They must exercise the
freedom tbat their positions allow; they must acknowledge that legal the~
ory and narrative, unlike politics and law, ultimately are forms of artistic
play. The theorists, and we, will more fully understand the moral signifi~
cance of our legal theory once it'> true nature is acknowledged.
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